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Background Checks and Social Effects: 
Contemporary Residential Tenant-Screening 
Problems in Washington State 
Eric Dunn & Marina Grabchuk 
INTRODUCTION 
In October 2007, the website FreeCreditReport.com—not to be confused 
with the publicly mandated annualcreditreport.com1—launched a series of 
television commercials featuring a young singer who laments having 
neglected to watch over his credit report. He is turned down for jobs, loans, 
and in one spot, housing: 
 
Well I married my dream girl, I married my dream girl 
But she didn’t tell me her credit was bad 
So now instead of living in a pleasant suburb 
We’re living in the basement at her mom and dad’s 
Now we can’t get a loan for a respectable home 
Just because my girl defaulted on some old credit card 
If we’d gone to free credit report dot com 
I’d be a happy bachelor with a dog and a yard.2 
 
Some might agree with the singer—that he should have run his fiancée’s 
credit report before saying “I do.” Others might find the thought revolting. 
But there is no denying the jingle’s underlying premise: poor credit 
absolutely can doom a young couple’s dreams of moving into their own 
home. And though most families who cannot qualify for a home loan would 
probably sooner rent an apartment than live in their parents’ basement, 
unfavorable credit reports are no less a barrier to obtaining rental housing. 
Indeed, those seeking housing in today’s rental market find it, in some 
ways, even more difficult than qualifying for a mortgage. Loan applications 
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are approved or denied almost exclusively on the basis of financial criteria.  
Rental applicants, however, must usually also satisfy a series of inquiries 
into matters of character, lifestyle, and personal history. This has long been 
the case, but modern information systems have vastly expanded the amount 
of information available to landlords about prospective tenants and the 
warped speeds at which that information can be obtained,. In today’s age of 
online public records and digital transmission, a rental applicant’s complete 
residential history, credit report, criminal record, civil litigation 
background, and other information are available within hours or even 
minutes, and in Washington, all at the prospective tenant’s expense.3 Some 
landlords access this information directly from public websites and 
databases; however, most contract with tenant-screening services (a subset 
of the consumer-reporting industry) to cull records from various sources 
and prepare custom “tenant-screening reports.” 
These technologies have revolutionized the processes by which rental 
housing providers choose tenants, supplementing or even replacing 
traditional tenant-screening tools like written applications, personal 
interviews, or phone calls to past landlords. Today’s residential landlords 
are able to choose their tenants much more selectively than in the past, and 
do so in hopes of reducing the risk of leasing to a tenant who will default in 
rent, damage the premises, or be otherwise problematic. As is common with 
technological advances, however, these benefits have come at significant, 
though largely overlooked, social costs.  
In Washington, individuals and families are frequently denied housing 
due to inaccurate or misleading background reports that they have no 
practical way of correcting.4 Other potential tenants are deterred by or 
unable to afford screening fees, which, if they pay and are rejected at one 
property, they must pay again to apply elsewhere.5 Still others find they are 
simply unable to rent at all; they are disqualified from the rental market 
almost entirely due to past eviction lawsuits, criminal prosecutions, 
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domestic violence protection order cases, poor consumer credit, or other 
disfavored characteristics.6 
In Washington, unfavorable tenant-screening reports probably do not 
deter too many marriages among perfectly matched mates, but they do keep 
plenty of people living in their parents’ basements. Contemporary tenant-
screening practices (and the exclusionary policies they support) also swell 
the ranks of the homeless,7 frustrate offender reentry programs, deter 
domestic violence survivors from leaving abusive partners, chill existing 
tenants from asserting basic legal rights, and cause other significant public 
policy effects Washington can scarcely afford to ignore. 
This article will take a deeper look at these problems, how they arose, 
and possible methods to address them. Part One looks at current residential 
screening industry practices, including common tenant-selection criteria, 
and the procedures and information sources that landlords use to evaluate 
applicants. Part Two will detail how these practices lead to social problems, 
such as unfair rejections for rental housing or the collective effects of 
disqualifying people categorically from broad sections of the rental market 
due to criminal records, eviction cases, or poor credit. Part Three examines 
the limited strengths and numerous drawbacks to the few potential legal 
remedies for frustrated rental applicants under existing U.S. and 
Washington law, including theories under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 
Washington’s Residential-Landlord Tenant Act and Consumer Protection 
Act, fair housing statutes, and privacy claims. Finally, Part Four discusses 
possible legislative solutions that, if enacted, could mitigate abusive tenant-
screening practices in Washington, such as proposals for “portable 
screening reports,” enhanced procedures for sealing judicial records, and 
expanded protection for tenants under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 
I. CURRENT INDUSTRY NORMS 
Tenant-screening policies typically entail two components: a set of 
criteria for accepting tenants and a method for determining whether a 
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particular applicant meets those criteria. Both aspects profoundly affect how 
rental housing opportunities are distributed in Washington. 
A. Tenant-Selection Criteria 
The purpose of tenant screening is to predict the likelihood that a 
particular rental applicant will make (what the landlord considers) a “good 
tenant.” To this end, the criteria landlords use for selecting tenants can 
range from amorphous judgments about an applicant’s desirability to formal 
admission policies that evaluate applicants across a wide spectrum of 
factors. But most of the time, rental criteria relate to the essential 
requirements of residential tenancies like paying rent and complying with 
basic rules. Despite variations from one housing provider to the next, basic 
criteria usually fall along the twin axes of financial suitability and 
behavioral suitability.8 
Financial suitability means being able to meet the anticipated pecuniary 
obligations of the tenancy.9 This most obviously includes rent, as well as 
other expected expenses such as utility bills, security deposits, renter’s 
insurance (if required), and so on. Some landlords may also consider 
whether the applicant would be likely to pay a claim or judgment in the 
event of damage to the premises, early lease termination, or other breach.10 
Many housing providers assess financial suitability using mathematical 
formulas or thresholds (e.g., monthly gross income of two-and-a-half to 
three times the rent is common).11 An applicant may also need to 
demonstrate that the income is reliable, such as through a minimum 
duration of employment.12 Some landlords may require a cosigner or extra 
security deposit for applicants whose financial qualifications are  
marginal.13 Notably, many housing providers refuse to accept tenants who 
rely on child support, government housing subsidies, welfare benefits, or 
certain other often-stigmatized income sources.14 Even assuming the tenant 
has the financial resources to afford the rent and other bills, a history of late 
Background Checks and Social Effects  323 
VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 1 • 2010 
payments, debts—especially to former landlords—or other adverse credit 
history can disqualify a rental applicant.15 
Behavioral suitability means satisfying the housing provider that the 
applicant will follow the rules, fulfill other nonfinancial obligations of the 
tenancy, and live harmoniously in the community.16 This determination is 
typically based on an applicant’s history at previous residences, as shown 
by interviews with the applicant, with prior landlords and other references, 
and, especially, with various background reports such as civil litigation 
records, criminal histories, and credit scores. Applicants who receive critical 
reports from past housing providers or who cannot demonstrate a stable 
residential history are generally treated less favorably.17 Applicants with 
acute blemishes such as bankruptcies, foreclosures, eviction records, or 
felony convictions are often categorically excluded.18 
B. Screening Methods and Information Sources 
Today’s landlords commonly obtain the reports that facilitate the use of 
both financial and behavioral tenant-selection criteria from background-
check providers,19 many of whom specialize in so-called “tenant screening” 
and others who also conduct pre-employment screening and other types of 
consumer reports.20 Tenant-screening companies can provide residential 
landlords almost-instant access to extensive background information about 
practically any rental applicant. Tenant-screening reports, which typically 
cost between $35 and $75 per adult occupant21—with the entire cost 
generally passed along to the applicant22—commonly include four main 
components concerning an applicant: (1) a residential history; (2) a credit 
report; (3) a criminal background check; and (4) civil litigation records 
(especially eviction reports).23 In addition, many tenant-screening services 
also market analysis or evaluation of this raw information, usually in the 
form of “scores” or “recommendations” concerning the applicant’s fitness 
for tenancy.24 The methods and practices by which this information is 
compiled, expressed, transmitted, analyzed, verified, and ultimately used 
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present new challenges for contemporary consumer advocates as well as the 
judicial system itself. We begin with a closer look at the reports. 
1. Residential History 
Housing providers routinely require applicants to disclose their prior 
residences for the preceding period, often about three to seven years into the 
past, usually on a written rental application. This residential history 
provides names and contact information for past housing providers, and 
indicates the proper states and localities to search for criminal records, civil 
litigation records, or other public records. Most housing providers and 
screening services will cross-check past addresses that an applicant supplies 
against a credit report or other external sources. The failure to fully and 
accurately disclose past housing providers or places of residence may alone 
be sufficient grounds for rejection.25 Some screening services, usually for 
higher fees, will interview past housing providers and include the resulting 
information in the screening report,26 whether verbatim, in a summary or 
abbreviated form, or by incorporation into a recommendation or other 
evaluation of the applicant’s desirability. 
2. Credit Reports 
Another regular feature of a tenant-screening report is a credit report, that 
is, a “consumer report,”27 about the applicant from a credit bureau, often 
(but not always) from one of the so-called “big three” credit bureaus:28 
Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union.29 Although “credit bureau” has no 
official meaning in U.S. law,30 the term is popularly understood to mean “a 
company that collects information from various sources and provides 
consumer credit information on individual consumers for a variety of 
uses.”31 A credit report will generally list an applicant’s prior addresses, 
consumer accounts and the status of each account, bankruptcies, 
foreclosures, civil judgments, and records of other financial obligations 
(such as support orders, criminal fines, restitution orders, etc.).32 The credit 
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report should also identify anyone who has requested the report and the 
purpose of such inquiries.33 
3. Criminal Background Checks 
A criminal background check is a consumer report containing 
information related to arrests, criminal charges, or convictions pertaining to 
the applicant.34 Some screening services search for criminal records only in 
local jurisdictions; others search across the country for records or in any 
jurisdiction where the applicant has reported living.35 Though there is no 
nationwide database or other central repository of criminal records, some 
tenant-screening companies offer a fifty-state search for criminal records, 
which may include jurisdictions where the applicant has never lived or even 
visited.36 
In Washington, criminal records are available through the WATCH 
(Washington Access To Criminal History) database, which is maintained by 
the Washington State Patrol.37 WATCH contains records produced by 
courts and criminal justice agencies throughout the state and include 
conviction records, records of arrests within one year if pending disposition, 
and records of registered sex offenders and kidnappers.38 WATCH matches 
records to the name, date of birth, or other identifiers used in the search 
inquiry.39 Any member of the public can access WATCH online and obtain 
an immediate criminal record for a $10 fee per search.40 
Like with credit reports, some tenant screeners—particularly those that 
market nationwide criminal-history reports—purchase private criminal-
background reports for resale as part of the tenant-screening package.41 
Hundreds of private vendors assemble and resell criminal records as part of 
background checks for pre-employment and tenant screening.42 The largest 
providers include USIS Commercial Services, which has over thirty 
thousand clients and performs more than four million reports per year, and 
Choice Point, which conducts over three million background checks per 
year and claims to perform criminal screening for half of America’s largest 
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companies.43 Many private vendors maintain their own “shadow databases,” 
which may contain criminal records that have been expunged or vacated, or 
otherwise restricted or sealed to public access.44 
4. Civil Litigation Records 
Tenant-screening reports also usually contain records concerning various 
forms of civil litigation, most of which are obtained directly from courts or 
court-maintained indices.45 Money judgments usually appear on credit 
reports, such as in collections cases for consumer or medical debt.46 Judicial 
foreclosure actions are rare in Washington, but may also appear in screening 
reports.47 Other civil litigation records common in tenant-screening reports 
include rental collections,48 tenant-initiated landlord-tenant suits,49 
antiharassment or domestic violence protection order proceedings,50 and 
civil commitment proceedings.51 
Most important are unlawful detainer (i.e., eviction) lawsuits52 which 
tenant-screening firms report when the applicant is named as a defendant. In 
Washington, unlawful detainer cases are heard in county-level superior 
courts.53 Civil case records for superior courts, including unlawful detainer 
actions (UDs) are indexed in the Superior Court Management Information 
System (SCOMIS), a statewide electronic case management database.54 
SCOMIS data is free and instantly accessible by anyone via internet.55 
Whenever a new civil action is filed in any of Washington’s thirty-nine 
superior courts, the clerk enters the parties’ names, case number, and “case 
type” into SCOMIS; for an eviction lawsuit, the case type will appear as 
“unlawful detainer.” In addition to the public site, the Washington 
Administrative Office of the Courts provides a subscription service whereby 
subscribers may periodically download SCOMIS data into private computer 
systems.56 
Landlords and tenant-screening services can find out whether a 
prospective tenant has ever been sued for unlawful detainer in Washington 
by running a name search in SCOMIS (or a private database containing 
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information downloaded from SCOMIS). A person who has such a record is 
deemed by the tenant-screening industry to have an “eviction history.”57 
Detecting an eviction history may be fast and free to anyone with internet 
access, but more detailed and trustworthy information about civil actions is 
comparatively difficult, expensive, and time-consuming to obtain. SCOMIS 
does allow access to cryptic docket entries in pending or recently closed 
cases, but it does not include or link to any additional records or documents 
containing the claims, defenses, findings, evidence, or other details about 
cases being searched.58 Some superior courts, such as King County’s, make 
scanned case documents available on-line—but for a fee, and access 
requires a special account.59 Few housing providers choose to incur such 
expenses and delays to obtain more detailed records. 
II. CURRENT PROBLEMS IN TENANT-SCREENING 
Contemporary tenant-screening practices raise two types of problems for 
residential tenants in Washington. First, tenant-screening reports that 
contain inaccurate or misleading information impair many tenants’ housing 
prospects undeservedly.  Second, exclusionary policies deprive many 
individuals and families of access to housing for reasons that, while based 
on true information, are objectively unfair or conflict with other significant 
public policy goals.  
A. Inaccurate or Misleading Information in Tenant-Screening Reports 
Studies assessing the accuracy of consumer reports show alarming rates 
of factual errors. A 2004 study based on 197 interviews across thirty U.S. 
states found errors in 79 percent of respondents’ “big three” consumer 
reports.60 One in four of those errors were significant enough to cause a 
consumer’s wrongful denial of credit.61 An ABC News investigation in 
2008 uncovered “dozens of lawsuits, on behalf of hundreds of people, filed 
in the last two years against the major criminal records database companies, 
alleging that background checks contain inaccurate information about 
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criminal convictions.”62 Public records databases can be compromised by 
similar errors. For instance, state sex offender registries, which often rely on 
offenders to update their own listings, are notorious for reporting outdated 
or inaccurate information.63 
Tenant-screening reports typically incorporate several components into a 
single report.64 This suggests that the chance of finding significant errors in 
a tenant-screening report is at least as high as the combined likelihood of 
finding errors in each particular component,65 and additional opportunities 
for clerical errors and other mistakes tend to arise any time a screening 
agency interprets, repackages, abridges, or otherwise modifies information 
in a component part. This is especially true of scores or recommendations 
based on criminal and civil litigation records, which may require substantial 
skill to properly interpret.66 
Types of errors common in background checks include overreporting 
(i.e.., when a record about a different person with the same name as the 
applicant is reported as being a potential match for the applicant),67 records 
based on criminal identity theft (i.e., where an actual arrestee gives a false 
name or claims to be another actual person), reports containing expunged 
records, and mundane clerical errors.68 Washington’s public records 
systems are susceptible to all of these problems.  
WATCH reports records based on replicable identifiers such as names 
and birth dates, which can lead to a high incidence of potential matches and, 
thus, overreporting of criminal records.69 The possibility for potential 
matches is even higher with SCOMIS, which narrows name searches only 
by county.70 Inevitable clerical errors occur, whether by court clerks, law 
enforcement personnel, or others inputting information or making changes 
in the database.71 Safeguards against identity theft—criminal or otherwise—
do not exist. For these reasons, WATCH warns users that it “cannot 
guarantee the records you obtain through this site relate to the person on 
whom you are seeking information,”72 while SCOMIS makes “no 
representations regarding the identity of any person whose name appears on 
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these pages,” and warns that data may not be “accurate or complete [or] in 
its most current form.”73 
A related problem is the presentation of true information in misleading 
ways, resulting in harm to prospective tenants. For instance, criminal 
history reports often make “several criminal charges connected with one 
arrest look like they involve multiple incidents.”74 A report showing that a 
rental applicant was sued for unlawful detainer often creates an impression 
that the person was evicted, even though she may have been improperly 
sued or prevailed in the case.75 In fact, eviction reports seldom contain more 
than the most basic information about unlawful detainer suits: the names of 
the parties, the court where the action was filed, and a filing date.76 Further 
details—such as the grounds for suit, any defenses raised, or the outcome—
are typically omitted or, if included at all, reported in a perfunctory, 
incomplete, or even incoherent manner. 
Figure 1 shows an eviction report prepared by On-Site Manager, Inc., a 
major tenant-screening company active in Washington. This report exceeds 
the norm in that it gives the address of the property and the name and 
telephone number of the plaintiff’s attorney. But the report does not state 
the outcome or present status of the case, nor does it indicate whether the 
property was a residence, commercial property, or other type of tenancy. 
The grounds for suit are not stated, and the cryptic abbreviation “2NV” 
(under “Notice Type”) is nowhere else defined. The report makes no 
mention of any defenses raised or of any findings or adjudications by the 
court. Perhaps most importantly, all the information appears on a grid 
labeled “Evictions.” 
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Erroneously attributed criminal records or eviction cases can obviously 
cause applicants to be denied housing, for such records make applicants 
appear as less desirable tenants than they truly are. Inaccurate or misleading 
screening reports also cause applicants to be rejected for nondisclosure or 
misrepresentation, as housing providers almost always ask potential tenants 
to disclose any criminal convictions or eviction suits on their applications, 
and false or incomplete information is usually an independent basis for 
rejection.77 Despite the serious consequences of such errors and misleading 
information, correcting inaccurate tenant-screening reports is seldom 
practical or beneficial to rental applicants. 
B. Monitoring or Correcting Inaccurate Tenant-Screening Reports 
Both the federal and Washington Fair Credit Reporting Acts provide 
dispute and reinvestigation mechanisms that enable consumers to rectify 
inaccurate or misleading credit records.78 These statutory procedures 
obligate a consumer reporting agency79 (“CRA”) that receives a dispute 
concerning the accuracy or completeness of information on a “consumer 
report” to “reinvestigate” the item, at no charge to the consumer, within 
thirty days.80 Unless the CRA verifies the disputed entry, the information 
must be “promptly delete[d] from the file of the consumer, or modif[ied] as 
appropriate, based on the results of the reinvestigation.”81 If reinvestigation 
does not resolve the dispute, the CRA must permit the consumer to file a 
“brief statement setting forth the nature of the dispute” along with the 
adverse item.82 
Albeit imperfect, this process at least enables consumers who anticipate 
applying for credit to take proactive steps that can prevent them from being 
turned down or charged higher rates due to inaccurate information. But a 
vital component in this scheme is an automated updating system, “e-Oscar” 
(for Online Solution for Complete and Accurate Reporting),83 through 
which the results of any reinvestigation and correction by one national 
credit bureau are automatically transmitted to other national credit bureaus 
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on a periodic basis.84 Because of e-Oscar, a consumer only needs to dispute 
an item with one national credit bureau to correct the same information with 
all of them.85 
In stark contrast, rental applicants have no practical method to check their 
tenant-screening reports or to dispute inaccurate or misleading information 
in advance of a housing search. Only CRAs that “regularly engage in the 
practice of assembling or evaluating, and maintaining . . . [c]redit account 
information from persons who furnish that information regularly and in the 
ordinary course of business” are required to participate in e-Oscar or a 
comparable automated reinvestigation or updating service.86 Tenant-
screening agencies tend to avoid this requirement because they do not 
ordinarily receive regular credit account updates from banks, credit card 
companies, or other “furnishers.”87 Because there are dozens of tenant-
screening services operating in Washington,88 obtaining and reviewing 
tenant-screening reports from so many companies, as well as disputing any 
inaccuracies found in the reports, is not feasible.89 
Also, unlike the big three and other CRAs that maintain running files on 
all consumers, a tenant-screening firm customarily compiles a report on a 
specific rental applicant only when requested by a housing provider.90 Upon 
transmitting that report to a landlord, the screening service ordinarily will 
not continue to collect or update information about that applicant, and may 
even delete the file altogether.91 When a screening company has no report to 
obtain and review ahead of time,92 it is nearly impossible for a consumer to 
preemptively assure his report is accurate, even if he knows which 
screening service the prospective landlord will use. 
Housing providers typically order tenant-screening reports only upon 
receiving rental applications for then-available dwelling units and usually 
make prompt use of such reports.93 If a report contributes to an applicant’s 
rejection, the landlord must so inform the applicant and provide the name, 
address, and telephone number of the screening service that supplied it.94 
The applicant may then obtain a free copy of that report (from the screening 
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firm) within the next sixty days, which the consumer may use to detect and 
dispute any inaccuracies that may have led to the denial.95 But submitting 
such a dispute is seldom worthwhile. 
Disputing an inaccurate or misleading tenant-screening report after a 
denial is often futile because the desired rental unit will likely be leased to 
another person well before a rejected applicant can obtain the report, lodge 
a dispute, wait up to thirty days for the reinvestigation, and (if successful) 
secure a corrected report, which may or may not cause the housing provider 
to reconsider the application.96 Because there are so many tenant-screening 
firms operating in Washington, the next housing provider to whom the 
applicant applies is unlikely to request a screening report from the same 
source.97 Furthermore, if the disputed information is derived from an 
erroneous or misleading public record, the CRA may not even owe a duty to 
correct its report unless (and until) the public record itself is corrected.98 
C. Multiple Screening Fees for the Same Information 
Another problem associated with incorrect records is multiple screening 
fees. A person who applies for housing at successive providers must 
ordinarily pay a separate screening fee each time, even though the reports 
purchased with those fees usually contain substantially identical 
information.99 Applicants with blemished credit or adverse background 
information often face a substantial risk of rental rejections and the 
associated prospect of paying multiple screening fees any time they search 
for rental housing.100 For these individuals, screening fees can easily extend 
into the hundreds of dollars,101 sometimes consuming funds that might be 
needed for security deposits, moving expenses, or other housing-related 
costs.102 Social service agencies that offer financial assistance with such 
expenses are similarly affected.103 
Landlords have little incentive to limit screening costs. Though 
Washington prohibits landlords from earning profits on tenant-screening 
charges, landlords can, and almost always do, pass the entire cost of 
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screening reports on to applicants.104 Borderline applicants, faced with the 
prospect of paying such fees repeatedly, may limit their housing searches to 
inferior properties and less desirable neighborhoods rather than risk money 
on application fees at high-quality rental properties they perceive as more 
likely to deny them.105 On a collective level, this phenomenon may foster 
the concentration of poverty and frustrate efforts to promote diverse and 
economically integrated communities. 
D. Social Consequences of Outsourcing to Tenant-Screening Services 
A rental decision theoretically entails a unique evaluation of whether the 
applicant’s household appears consistent with the nature of the housing and 
whether the applicant is likely to comply with the relevant rules and 
policies, coexist peaceably with the neighbors, and fulfill the financial 
obligations of the tenancy. Yet in practice, this analysis is typically reduced 
to a purely mechanical comparison of rigid suitability criteria against 
individual applicants’ background reports. Tenant-screening services often 
facilitate such decision making by marketing scores, recommendations, or 
other opinions concerning prospective tenants, purportedly based on the raw 
reports.106 Some invite landlords to outsource rental decisions entirely by 
selling only the opinion (e.g., “accept” or “reject”) and withholding the data 
upon which it is predicated.  
For example, the Rental Housing Association of Puget Sound (RHA) 
offers a product it calls “Rent Right,” in which the landlord is provided only 
a decision (either “Approved,” “Approved with Conditions,” or “Declined”) 
and is not given any reason for the decision or permitted to view any of the 
applicant’s credit details.107 RHA extols this method as sparing landlords 
“[t]he task of reading and understanding complex credit reports.”108 Unlike 
housing providers themselves, a screening service has no countervailing 
incentive to approve marginal tenants, which may cause screening 
companies to apply the selection criteria more strictly than landlords would 
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if making rental decisions themselves—though, under tighter rental market 
conditions, even landlords themselves tend to be extremely selective.109 
Rental recommendations, and the ultimate approvals or rejections, are 
typically predicated on the broadly accepted assumption that a person’s past 
is the best predictor of future performance—in this case, as a tenant. But its 
strict application tends to produce controversial consequences that threaten 
numerous public policy concerns. Rental policies excluding applicants who 
lack a “stable housing history,” for instance, inhibit public efforts to combat 
homelessness. Overly restrictive rules against applicants with criminal 
records frustrate offender-reentry initiatives. Excluding applicants with 
certain disfavored income sources (like housing vouchers, welfare benefits, 
or child support) undermines the efficacy of poverty relief and welfare 
programs. Rules which disqualify applicants with records of home 
foreclosures tend to multiply, often arbitrarily, the economic and social ills 
of the recent national foreclosure crisis. Then, probably the most significant 
tenant-screening abuse is the widespread practice of automatically rejecting 
applicants with “eviction” records. 
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In much of Washington, residential landlords commonly reject any 
applicant who has been involved in an unlawful detainer litigation against a 
prior landlord, period—regardless of whether the case resulted in a 
judgment for the landlord and physical “eviction” of the tenant, a complete 
dismissal and exoneration of the tenant on all claims, or anywhere in 
between.110 It may be only natural that landlords seek to avoid leasing to 
tenants they perceive as “high risk,” but the practice dramatically impairs 
the rental housing opportunities of a significant number of Washington 
families.111 On a widespread basis, this exclusionary practice erodes access 
to our courts, weakens the due process rights of all residential tenants, and 
relegates some to an intractable condition of homelessness.112 
Rental policies which automatically disqualify applicants because of 
unlawful detainer suits undermine access to justice by chilling tenants from 
even appearing in landlord-tenant court.113 Tenants who have meritorious 
defenses and compelling evidence often decide that preserving a particular 
tenancy is not worth the damage that an unlawful detainer record will inflict 
upon their future rental prospects—especially when that damage is not 
ameliorated by a favorable outcome in the case.114 Consequently, rather 
than assert defenses, tenants often decide simply to move out after being 
served eviction notices or unfiled legal pleadings.115 Housing providers 
justify these exclusions on grounds of efficiency and economy (since 
obtaining and evaluating additional information about an unlawful detainer 
action can impose significant costs, delays, and other difficulties), but 
cynically, many landlords are equally or even more strongly averse to 
having tenants who have successfully defended against eviction lawsuits by 
prior housing providers.116 
This phenomenon affects not only those tenants facing the specter of 
eviction lawsuits, but any tenant who seeks to enforce rights against a 
landlord. This can include demanding repairs, enforcing the provisions of a 
lease agreement, objecting to discriminatory or retaliatory conduct, and so 
forth.117 When a landlord may inflict a serious and permanent injury upon a 
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tenant’s future housing opportunities merely by filing suit—a measure 
solely within the landlord’s control—tenants are deterred from doing 
anything they predict might invite litigation.118 Of course, not all tenants 
avoid being sued for unlawful detainer or incurring other irreparable 
injuries to their rent-worthiness. 
E. The Result: “Unhouseables” 
The process of screening prospective residential tenants naturally implies 
that some will be accepted as tenants by particular landlords and others will 
not. Though rental rejections may often be attributed to errors and false 
impressions, plenty of rental applicants do have damaged credit, lack bank 
accounts or other established credit, have been arrested or convicted of 
criminal offenses, have been asked to leave previous rental properties, sued 
for unlawful detainer, or evicted by a court, or have recently been homeless 
or without verifiable “residential history.” Many of these would-be tenants 
encounter great difficulty nowadays in locating willing landlords, often on 
the basis of information that few landlords would have discovered before 
the age of digitized records and free online databases.119 Indeed, as the 
information available to landlords has increased, so too have the grounds 
for rejecting applicants, especially in tight market conditions when overly 
selective criteria are not punished.120 
To many such applicants, the cost of these difficulties is measurable in 
hours wasted in futile apartment searches and hundreds of dollars in 
application fees.121 Yet many such applicants secure housing eventually—
even if in substandard facilities or less-than-desirable locations.  
Increasingly, however, tarnished rental applicants are finding they are 
unable to secure any housing at all.122 As a 2004 study observed in 
connection with tenant-screening legislation then pending in Minnesota, 
“the increasingly popular use of tenant-screening reports has resulted in a 
new class of people who are unable to access rental housing because of past 
credit problems, evictions, poor rental histories, or criminal 
338 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
RESIDENTIAL TENANT-SCREENING 
backgrounds.”123 More locally, housing counselors and advocates from 
major social services agencies, such as Seattle’s Solid Ground, have cited 
tenant-screening as an issue of top priority to their clients and a first-rank 
barrier to reducing homelessness in Washington.124 
III. POTENTIAL REMEDIES UNDER EXISTING LAW 
Though Washington has made no effort to comprehensively regulate the 
tenant-screening industry, a handful of laws bearing more broadly on 
subjects like fair housing, landlord-tenant, and credit reporting do reach 
certain tenant-screening practices, sometimes substantially. 
A. Tenant-Selection Criteria 
Perhaps the most straightforward legal theory for challenging unfair 
tenant-screening practices is a simple breach of contract claim. A person 
who applies for rental housing presumably contracts with the landlord for a 
good-faith consideration of her application (especially if a fee is paid), so a 
landlord’s unreasonable rejection of the application could sustain an 
actionable claim.125 An unreasonable or bad-faith basis for rejection might 
be a ground contrary to the landlord’s established rental criteria,126 a reason 
unrelated to predicting future performance in a tenancy, or some socially 
malevolent basis that conflicts with public policy.127 Also, since a rental 
application involves an interest in land, the unjust denial of a leasing 
application constitutes an irreparable injury for which a court could order 
specific performance.128 But, while appealing in the abstract, numerous 
practical considerations undermine breach of contract as a viable legal 
theory for addressing tenant-screening problems. 
Two significant proof problems immediately emerge. While many do so 
voluntarily, no law requires Washington landlords to establish, publish, or 
abide by particular tenant-selection policies. Where tenant-selection policies 
are tacit or even ad hoc, it may be impossible for an applicant to 
demonstrate that he qualified for the rental under the relevant criteria. Even 
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if the criteria are known, a rental applicant may be unable to prove a 
deviation from those criteria because Washington law permits a landlord to 
deny a rental application without disclosing the reasons for rejection.129 All 
that Washington law does require is that the landlord inform the rental 
applicant (either orally or in writing) of the denial, and if a tenant-screening 
service was used the landlord must provide its name and address.130 This 
lack of transparency may prevent a rental applicant from detecting that his 
rental application was denied unfairly, let alone prove such a claim. 
The lack of viable remedies is another significant obstacle. Since an 
offending landlord will typically rent vacant premises to another tenant well 
before a rejected applicant could bring a lawsuit or obtain relief, gaining 
access to the desired premises is often not feasible.131 Even if the rental unit 
is still available, many prospective tenants would probably prefer not to 
start new tenancies with landlords embittered by litigation. Courts may also 
be reluctant to issue injunctions likely to require extensive subsequent 
oversight.132 This means damages, though inadequate as a matter of law,133 
may be the only realistic remedy for a wrongful denial of rental housing 
claim. Such damages, which might include the application fee, related 
incidental costs, and possibly compensation for loss of expectation (e.g., if 
the tenant had to pay more in rent or settle for inferior housing elsewhere), 
would often appear inadequate to make bringing a lawsuit for damages 
worthwhile, particularly given the absence of a fee-shifting statute.134 
1. Residential Landlord-Tenant Act 
An applicant who feels he was wrongfully denied rental housing may 
also consider bringing an action under Washington’s Residential Landlord 
Tenant Act (RLTA), a 1973 statute that governs most residential tenancies 
in Washington.135 With one exception, the RLTA does not regulate the 
grounds by which landlords may select tenants; but it does impose a general 
duty of good faith in all landlord-tenant transactions.136 A landlord who 
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rejects an applicant for an untenable reason (such as those discussed above) 
theoretically violates this duty of good faith. 
The RLTA, however, provides no specific remedy for a breach of the 
duty of good faith, and in the only reported case discussing the provision, 
the Washington Court of Appeals, Division I, openly questioned whether 
the duty actually affords tenants “a substantive right to good faith treatment 
by the landlord.”137 Basic principles of statutory construction suggest that 
the RLTA duty of good faith is substantively enforceable,138 but without 
specific remedies for a violation, the good faith provision appears scarcely 
more helpful to rental applicants than the analogous breach of contract 
theory. 
2. Consumer Protection Act 
Another statute that provides mistreated rental applicants with a potential 
avenue for legal redress is the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), which 
prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”139 Unlike the RLTA, 
common law, or good faith theories discussed above, the CPA provides 
distinct and potent remedies for persons injured by unfair or deceptive 
practices, including actual damages, costs and attorney fees, injunctions 
against “further violations,” and even exemplary damages.140 The 
Washington Supreme Court has also authorized other types of equitable 
relief in association with CPA claims on the basis of “[t]he superior court’s 
inherent authority to enforce orders and fashion judgments.”141 
To establish a CPA claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant 
committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the scope of trade or 
commerce, that the act or practice affects the public interest, and that the act 
or practice injured the plaintiff.142 A rental applicant who is rejected for an 
objectively unfair reason could, it would certainly appear, state a CPA claim 
under these elements. The same kinds of tenant-selection policies that might 
give rise to a common law or RLTA bad faith claim would presumably also 
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enable a CPA unfair practice claim—indeed, “unfair” probably covers a 
broader range of practices than “bad faith.”143 The leasing of residential 
homes is commerce, and tenant-selection practices affect the public, 
because landlords regularly advertise vacancies, solicit applications, and 
make leasing decisions in the course of their business.144 But while the CPA 
appears to be a promising tool for challenging unfair rental housing 
rejections, appearances can sometimes be deceiving.  
In 1985, the Washington Supreme Court ruled in State v. Schwab that 
residential tenants may not sue landlords for unfair or deceptive practices 
under the CPA.145 It is unclear whether (and to what extent) Schwab reaches 
transactions between landlords and rental applicants (i.e., persons who have 
applied for rental housing but have not yet been accepted as tenants).146 The 
RLTA sets forth the rights and duties belonging to persons defined as 
“landlords” and “tenants,” rental applicants are not mentioned, and the 
definition of “tenant,” though broad (“any person who is entitled to occupy 
a dwelling unit primarily for living or dwelling purposes under a rental 
agreement”), does not embrace applicants.147 The original RLTA did not 
feature any provisions governing transactions between landlords and 
applicants, and no such components had been inserted by the time of 
Schwab in 1985. Thus, it is reasonably clear the legislature did not 
originally intend the RLTA, rather than the CPA, to govern transactions 
between landlords and rental applicants. 
However, in 1991 and 2004, two provisions governing transactions 
between landlords and applicants were added to the RLTA.148 One of the 
1991 amendments (now codified at RCW 59.18.253 and 257) limited the 
fees landlords can charge for the cost of obtaining tenant-screening reports 
and background information.149 The other provision imposed rules on 
deposits to secure occupancy of rental units.150 These regulations benefit 
prospective “tenants,” rather than the actual tenants to whom the RLTA 
traditionally applied.151 Both provisions contain specific, self-contained 
remedies, and neither provision purports to authorize a CPA claim.152 
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The 1991 amendments are capable of two basic interpretations. One view 
is that by extending the RLTA to some transactions between landlords and 
“prospective tenants,” the legislature intended to bring all such relationships 
under the RLTA and, thus, exempt them from the CPA (per Schwab).153 
The other, more likely view, is that the legislature intended only to create a 
remedy for people charged excessive application fees or unfair rental 
deposits, and did not intend to fully determine which transactions between 
residential landlords and nontenants belonged within the RLTA. Whereas 
the RLTA had been a comprehensive statute governing practically all 
aspects of the landlord-tenant relationship, the 1991 amendments were 
directed at two specific problems: application fees and deposits. Also, the 
1991 limits on fees and deposits were designed to make rental housing more 
affordable to low-income people, not to counteract charges the legislature 
had found unfair or deceptive.154 The CPA may, therefore, not have 
appeared to be the appropriate enforcement tool. The findings did not 
indicate any intention for the 1991 amendments to extend Schwab to all 
transactions between residential landlords and rental applicants, or even any 
explicit consideration that the amendments could have such an effect.155 
In 2004, however, the RLTA acquired (for the first time) a provision that 
actually regulates a ground upon which landlords may select tenants: the 
Victim Protection Act (VPA).156 Among other things, the VPA prohibits a 
residential landlord from denying a rental application because of the 
person’s status as a victim of domestic violence or certain other crimes.157 
Like the 1991 RLTA amendments, the VPA is codified under the RLTA 
and provides specific, self-contained remedies for violations.158 The VPA 
did not comprehensively regulate the field of possible transactions between 
landlords and rental applicants; instead, it addresses a narrow set of specific 
evils—housing discrimination against domestic violence victims and the 
economic barriers to leaving abusive partners.159 Nevertheless, this 
regulation of a tenant-selection criterion expands the RLTA into an area in 
which it had been completely silent before 2004. 
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It is highly doubtful that, in prohibiting landlords from rejecting tenants 
on such an egregiously unfair and socially obnoxious basis as in the VPA, 
the legislature truly intended to extend the RLTA—and with it Schwab—to 
the full spectrum of residential tenant-selection decisions. But it can no 
longer be denied that the RLTA reaches tenant-selection practices, and 
some may interpret the VPA as evidence that the legislature assumed the 
RLTA applied to tenant selection all along (and, thus, that claims based on 
unfair tenant-screening practices are exempt from the CPA per Schwab). 
Followed to its logical conclusion, this argument assumes, probably 
unrealistically, that the legislature could not pass a law to protect domestic 
violence victims from housing discrimination without also revisiting 
Schwab. On the other hand, placing the VPA antidiscrimination provision 
under the RLTA makes it consistent with the Law Against Discrimination, 
under which housing discrimination claims are also specifically exempt 
from CPA enforcement.160 
It is likely only a matter of time before a Washington appellate court will 
have to decide squarely whether or not Schwab extends to rental applicants; 
in fact, several cases have come close. In the unpublished 2002 decision of 
Collard v. Reagan, the Court of Appeals, Division II, upheld an award of 
CPA damages to a group of rental applicants who had been scammed out of 
application fees and deposits by a residential landlord.161 The landlord 
argued on appeal that the CPA claim was barred by Schwab, but the Court 
of Appeals did not consider the defense because the landlord had not 
presented it to the trial court.162 
More promising for rental applicants is the 2001 case of Ethridge v. 
Hwang, in which the Washington Court of Appeals, Division I, declined to 
extend Schwab to mobile home park tenancies.163 In Ethridge, a mobile 
home park tenant attempted to sell his mobile home and located at least two 
potential buyers, but the park refused to approve either buyer to live in the 
park. The tenant contended that the park’s rejection of the buyers’ rental 
applications—which effectively frustrated the sales—was an unfair practice, 
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and brought several claims, including one under the CPA. The park 
challenged the CPA claim, reasoning that relationships between mobile 
home parks and their tenants are exclusively governed by the Mobile Home 
Landlord-Tenant Act (MHLTA), and thus, by analogy to Schwab, the park 
could not be held liable under the CPA. 
The Court of Appeals rejected the park’s argument, finding that “[t]he 
Legislature, in enacting the MHLTA to govern the unique case of mobile 
home tenancies, implicitly rejected the idea that the MHLTA and RLTA are 
substantially similar.”164 Because of a lack of detail in the Ethridge opinion, 
it is not clear what points of dissimilarity the court found relevant between 
the RLTA and MHLTA. But as none are immediately apparent, what 
Ethridge and Collard, together with Eifler v. Shurgard Capital 
Management165—a 1993 Court of Appeals, Division Two, decision holding 
the CPA applicable to a claim by the tenant of a self-storage unit against the 
storage company—may truly signal is a mounting discomfort with the far 
reaches of Schwab  among Washington’s appellate courts. 
3. Antidiscrimination Laws 
The clearest limitations on the criteria by which residential landlords may 
select tenants arise under classic fair housing laws, such as the federal Fair 
Housing Act166 and Washington’s Law Against Discrimination.167 Some 
Washington cities and counties have enacted significant local fair housing 
policies as well, such as Seattle’s Open Housing Ordinance168 or Tacoma’s 
Law Against Discrimination,169 which extend antidiscrimination protections 
to additional protected classes or broaden the membership of recognized 
groups by defining existing protected classes differently. Many of the 
problematic tenant-selection practices discussed above are assailable on fair 
housing theories, and because discriminatory tenant-selection practices can 
deprive others of opportunities to live in diverse communities, such 
challenges can sometimes be brought even by persons outside the relevant 
protected classes.170 
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a) Disparate Treatment Theories 
The most basic form of discrimination, “disparate treatment,” occurs 
where a landlord “expressly treats members of a protected group differently 
than others who are similarly situated.”171 Contemporary housing providers 
rarely employ criteria that overtly exclude members of statutorily protected 
classes or openly admit having rejected an applicant on a basis such as race, 
ethnicity, or another protected status.172 However, many landlords do not 
provide, and Washington law does not ordinarily require, any reason for 
rejecting a rental application.173 A landlord who rejects an application 
without explanation may, in fact, have denied the applicant for an unlawful, 
discriminatory reason. Therefore, a rejected applicant who belongs to a 
protected class can raise a prima facie case of disparate treatment through 
circumstantial evidence by showing that he met the minimum qualifications 
for the rental, and the property remained available for rent after he was 
denied.174 Confronted with such a claim, a landlord acquires a burden to 
“produce evidence that the refusal to rent or negotiate for a rental was 
motivated by legitimate, nondiscriminatory considerations.”175 A housing 
provider who cannot so justify a prospective tenant’s rejection may be liable 
for housing discrimination.176 
A landlord will ordinarily articulate at least a superficially legitimate 
reason for rejecting a rental applicant. If nothing else, the classic disparate 
treatment analysis can be useful for extracting such reasons. If the 
explanation given is insincere or pretextual, the applicant may yet prevail 
on the disparate treatment claim by refuting the justification.177 Often, 
however, the housing provider’s basis for rejecting a rental application will 
be a genuine policy that does not explicitly discriminate against members of 
any protected class. Most of the reasons discussed above meet these 
characteristics: a criminal record (whether arrests, charges, or convictions), 
an unstable housing history, a past unlawful detainer, poor overall credit, a 
negative reference by a prior landlord, etc.178 Contesting these kinds of 
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rejections on fair housing grounds usually entails application of the more 
sophisticated “disparate impact” theory. 
b) Disparate Impact Claims 
A rental applicant may establish a prima facie case of disparate impact 
discrimination by demonstrating that her application was denied pursuant to 
an “outwardly neutral practice” that causes “a significantly adverse or 
disproportionate impact on persons of a particular type produced by the 
defendant’s facially neutral acts or practices.”179 Statistical evidence is 
appropriate and often essential to prove disparate impact claims, and only 
the effects of the challenged practices are relevant—a plaintiff need not 
show that the landlord harbored any intent to discriminate unlawfully.180 If a 
rental applicant establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact, the 
challenged tenant-selection rule is presumed unlawful; only by 
demonstrating a “compelling business necessity” for the challenged practice 
can a landlord overcome the presumption of discrimination.181 
An example of a rental admissions policy that is “outwardly neutral” and 
well-suited to a disparate impact challenge is one that automatically 
excludes applicants with criminal records.182 Such a policy makes no 
explicit distinction between applicants based on race, national origin, 
gender, or any other protected status. Yet, a blanket exclusion of applicants 
with criminal records has a substantial adverse and disproportionate impact 
on African Americans who, as a group, are much more likely to be arrested, 
charged with crimes, and imprisoned.183 A policy of this kind is, thus, 
unlawful unless justified by a compelling business necessity.184 Such a 
justification is likely untenable because some potential applicants may make 
perfectly good tenants despite having criminal records, and because a 
landlord could, instead of a rigid exclusion, evaluate applicants on a case-
by-case basis and take other relevant factors—such as the nature of the 
crime and evidence of rehabilitation—into consideration.185 
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Countless other tenant-selection criteria are potentially assailable on 
disparate impact grounds. Landlords who refuse certain forms of income, 
such as welfare benefits, child support, or government housing subsidies, 
disproportionately harm members of groups more heavily represented 
among recipients of such income.186 Rigid minimum income rules (e.g., 
requiring applicants to have monthly income of three times the rent) can 
unlawfully exclude members of groups more highly represented among the 
local poverty population or exclude persons with disabilities, which 
preclude them from earning wages or otherwise increasing their financial 
resources.187 Requiring applicants to display a stable housing history may 
have discriminatory results on those who are or have recently endured 
homelessness, a group widely believed to consist disproportionately of 
persons with mental illness or other disabling conditions.188 Similar claims 
are possible on behalf of applicants who, despite having a background that 
raises legitimate cause for concern (e.g., serious criminal offenses, 
misconduct in past tenancies, a history of delinquency in the payment of 
rent or household utilities, etc.), face exclusion even despite proof of 
rehabilitation or changed circumstances.189 
Ironically, many landlords who adhere to formulaic admissions policies 
defend the practice as a means of avoiding unlawful discrimination in the 
selection of tenants. The RHA, for instance, claims its “Rent-Right Decision 
Model” saves landlords from “[p]otential inconsistent decision making, 
which may lead to claims under federal fair housing laws.”190 Even if, as 
RHA suggests, the objective of these products is to create only a veneer of 
equal treatment, the consistent application of standard, written rental 
admissions criteria across all manner of applicants is not generally 
inconsistent with notions of fair housing. But because outwardly objective 
rules often affect some applicants much more significantly than others—and 
sometimes those disproportionate effects fall more harshly upon members 
of protected classes—inflexible tenant-selection policies designed to 
insulate landlords from fair housing claims may actually do them more 
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harm than good, much to the chagrin of supposedly unwittingly 
discriminating landlords. 
c) Impediments to Disparate Impact Claims 
While intuition and anecdotal evidence suggest that members of certain 
protected classes are more deeply disadvantaged by particular tenant-
screening methods, reliable statistical evidence with which to investigate, 
confirm, and ultimately prove such disparate impact claims is often 
unavailable and cost-prohibitive to obtain.191 For instance, a significant 
empirical question in this regard is whether, and to what extent, unlawful 
detainer defendants are more highly represented among certain racial and 
ethnic groups or people with disabilities in Washington. The same factors 
that lead to higher rates of poverty, welfare use, incarceration, and other 
adverse economic statistics among people of color and people with 
disabilities seem likely to contribute to higher rates of eviction and 
nonjudicial displacement from housing.192 Some research shows that low-
income African-American women, especially those who are single mothers, 
tend to face eviction at disproportionately higher rates.193 
If members of one or more protected classes are significantly more likely 
to be sued for unlawful detainer, then the categorical exclusion of rental 
applicants with unlawful detainer records tends to cause a disparate impact 
on such groups.194 But mounting a viable fair housing challenge to such 
policies would require that the statistical evidence be assembled. 
Washington courts do not keep demographic data on unlawful detainer 
defendants, and no other reliable source from which such statistics might be 
derived is readily apparent. Some out-of-state sources exist, but data that is 
not specific to Washington or does not correlate directly to unlawful 
detainer case filings, may not be adequate to support a viable claim.195 
Common tenant-screening practices may also contribute to de facto 
housing segregation in Washington communities.196 People seeking rental 
housing are unlikely to apply where they expect to be rejected, especially 
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when a screening fee is required.197 Whether or not the criteria by which 
such rejections may occur are lawful, a rental applicant—particularly one 
with limited funds—may rationally forego attempts to obtain rental housing 
in preferred areas, and instead target less-desirable rental opportunities on 
the calculation that the tenant-selection criteria will be less stringent. 
Intuition suggests this process of self-screening, closely tied to the 
anticipated use of customary-screening criteria, may result in an unequal 
distribution of rental housing across racial, ethnic, and other lines. If so, fair 
housing laws may again provide a legal remedy. Yet, the practical 
impediments to establishing (or confirming the absence of) any such 
correlations, a likely prerequisite to any effective judicial challenge, could 
be even more intractable.198 
Apart from the ever-present challenge of obtaining demographic statistics 
and other costly empirical data to prove antidiscrimination laws, these laws 
ultimately cannot do all the work of a comprehensive tenant-screening 
regime. Abusive tenant-screening practices inflict negative social 
consequences along an axis different from—if sometimes overlapping 
with—that with which fair housing laws are concerned. Rental criteria that 
disqualify applicants with poor overall credit, unstable housing history, old 
or minor criminal records, undesirable income sources, or even some 
evictions, tend to most heavily affect those who have experienced poverty 
or homelessness—conditions that often correlate to race, gender, ethnicity, 
or disability. 
B. Challenging Inaccurate or Unfair Tenant-Screening Reports 
1. RCW 59.18.257 
The only state law regulating landlords who perform their own tenant-
screening is RCW 59.18.257, a provision of the RLTA that restricts a 
landlord from charging a prospective tenant more than the “actual costs in 
obtaining the background information, [up to] the customary costs charged 
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by a screening service in the general area.”199 The payment of a tenant-
screening fee is conditioned upon the landlord’s disclosure “in writing of 
what a tenant screening entails [and] the prospective tenant’s rights to 
dispute the accuracy of information provided by the [entities] who will be 
contacted for information concerning the tenant[.]”200 Liability for violating 
this provision is limited to “an amount not to exceed one hundred dollars.” 
However, an applicant’s incentive to enforce this right is further lessened in 
that the statute authorizes an award of court costs and attorney fees to the 
prevailing party—not necessarily a successful plaintiff.201 
Although this provision appears to offer little practical value to rental 
applicants, a few points are intriguing from a regulatory standpoint. First, 
the applicant’s “right to dispute the accuracy of information provided,” 
whether by a tenant-screening service or by “entities listed on the tenant 
application who will be contacted,” undoubtedly references the applicant’s 
right to lodge a Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) dispute with the tenant-
screening service202 and possibly a “furnisher” (that is, an entity that 
provided information to the screening service).203 It is plausible that this 
right to dispute inaccurate information may also guarantee an applicant the 
opportunity to present that dispute to the prospective new landlord.204 
The other logical interpretation of the “right to dispute the accuracy of 
information provided by the . . . entities listed on the tenant application”205 
would be recognition of a right to present the dispute directly to a past 
landlord, personal reference, or other person who supplied adverse 
information directly to the new landlord (but not via a tenant-screening 
service).206 But this interpretation would render the statutorily-referenced 
“right” superfluous, because no duties are imposed on such sources to 
reinvestigate, reconsider, or correct any inaccurate information they may 
have supplied or to inform the prospective landlord of any such errors or 
corrections.207 Recognizing a right to contest information with the 
prospective landlord not only gives force to the statutory language but it 
also appears most consistent with the pronounced legislative intent: “for 
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prospective tenants to be informed of their rights to dispute information 
they feel is inaccurate in order to help prevent denials of housing based 
upon incorrect information.”208 
If RCW 59.18.257 does establish a right to dispute inaccurate 
information with the prospective landlord, the statute is silent regarding the 
extent of consideration that landlords must afford to such disputes.209 But in 
view of the RLTA’s universal duty of good faith, it is not unreasonable to 
expect that a landlord must evaluate the dispute with at least some degree of 
substantive fairness, and perhaps more controversially, that the dispute must 
be considered before the premises are leased to another person.210 
Several other ambiguous terms in RCW 59.18.257 are also worth closer 
examination. For instance, the RLTA contains no definition for “tenant-
screening service.”211 The term probably refers to a consumer-reporting 
agency212 that makes consumer reports for use in approving or rejecting 
rental applications. But with no statutory definition, it is possible that 
“tenant-screening service” could be interpreted more broadly, and may draw 
in entities not included within the federal or state FCRA definitions of a 
“consumer reporting agency.” 
Also, the landlord’s duty to “notif[y] the prospective tenant in writing of 
what a tenant screening entails” is nowhere further clarified.213 This could 
mean that the landlord is required to inform the applicant of the type of 
background information the landlord will obtain, or it may require more 
details about the sources that will be contacted or specific questions asked. 
“[W]hat a tenant screening entails” could also include information about the 
landlord’s tenant-selection criteria, again in more or less detail—arguably, a 
housing provider that rejects a rental application based on criteria that were 
not disclosed to the tenant in writing before accepting a screening fee 
violates this section.214 
Still another ambiguity regarding RCW 59.18.257 is the statute’s silence 
as to whether a landlord may charge an applicant for the cost of obtaining a 
tenant-screening report if the same or a substantially similar report (i.e., one 
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with virtually identical contents) is available to the landlord free of charge. 
Even if most screening services will not prepare a report at the request of a 
consumer,215 once a report has been prepared, the FCRA requires a tenant-
screening company to disclose that report to the applicant on request,216 and 
for free if requested within sixty days of an adverse action.217 No law 
prevents unsuccessful rental applicants from obtaining a copy of their 
screening report and then presenting that same report to other prospective 
landlords in subsequent applications. 
It is plausible that RCW 59.18.257 could preclude a landlord who is 
offered such a “recycled” report from charging the applicant for the costs of 
obtaining another largely duplicative screening report.218 The statute 
authorizes a landlord to charge only “his or her actual costs in obtaining the 
background information,” and when the background information is 
available to the landlord free of charge, arguably the landlord’s “actual 
cost” for that information is $0.219 This would mean that a housing provider 
who insists on ordering a new tenant-screening report, rather than accept a 
substantially similar applicant-supplied report, could not lawfully charge the 
applicant for the cost of the additional report. The legislature does not 
appear to have anticipated that applicants would attempt to reuse tenant-
screening reports, but this construction is consistent with the spirit and 
purpose of RCW 59.18.257, making rental housing more accessible and 
affordable to low-income renters.220 
2. Disputes with Tenant-Screening Services 
No federal or Washington statute at present defines “tenant-screening 
service” or any equivalent,221 but usage suggests that it refers to a person or 
business that compiles and transmits consumer reports bearing on a 
person’s fitness for leasing and occupying rental property.222 Such entities 
are a type of CRA subject to the state and federal Fair Credit Reporting 
Acts (FRCAs),223 which prohibit CRAs from negligently reporting 
inaccurate or outdated information to landlords for use in selecting 
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tenants.224 Rental applicants certainly enjoy all of the same FCRA rights 
and protections pertinent to other consumer-reporting agencies.225 An 
exhaustive exploration of possible FCRA violations is beyond the scope of 
this article, but several distinct practices inconsistent with FCRA duties are 
common among, or unique to, tenant-screening agencies. 
At the heart of the FCRA is a requirement that “[w]henever a consumer 
reporting agency prepares a consumer report, it shall follow reasonable 
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information 
concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”226 “Preparing” a 
consumer report is distinguished in the same FCRA provision from 
“reselling” a report obtained from another CRA, such as a credit report or 
private criminal background check.227 Hence, the duty to follow reasonable 
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy applies to tenant-
screening agencies, most heavily with respect to eviction records, criminal 
background checks based on public record searches, recommendations or 
other evaluations of rent-worthiness, and other original content generated 
by screening services. 
In requiring “reasonable procedures” (for assuring the maximum 
accuracy of information in a consumer report), the FCRA does not impose 
strict liability for making a false consumer report.228 Rather, the statute 
applies a negligence standard under which the reasonableness of a consumer 
reporting procedure depends generally on “what a reasonably prudent 
person would do under the circumstances.”229 This is ordinarily a question 
of fact.230 The main factors in this analysis are the degree of harm a 
particular inaccuracy may potentially cause the consumer, the availability of 
procedures for improving accuracy, and the costs and burdens those 
additional procedures would impose.231 A fourth relevant factor may be the 
resources (or lack thereof) available to the particular screener.232 
As noted above, a prevailing practice among tenant-screening services in 
Washington is to report any filed unlawful detainer action as an “eviction,” 
based on the SCOMIS index alone, without explanation of underlying facts, 
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claims and defenses, or final disposition.233 Of course, a more effective way 
to guarantee accuracy of eviction reports would be to access and review the 
complete court records from unlawful detainer suits, rather than relying on 
the SCOMIS entries only.234 Typical documents in an unlawful detainer 
case file will include a complaint, an answer, motions, exhibits, 
declarations, court orders, and other materials setting forth the specific 
facts, arguments, findings, and particular circumstances of the suit.235 Thus, 
tenant-screening companies that report eviction suits without reviewing 
court files or taking other precautions probably do not follow reasonable 
procedures to ensure the maximum possible accuracy of their reports and 
would likely be found liable under the FCRA if a resulting report is 
inaccurate or casts the rental applicant in a false light.236 The Ninth Circuit 
has held that a CRA must consult and properly interpret court records when 
reinvestigating a consumer dispute,237 and the California Court of Appeals 
has held that a tenant-screening agency may not follow reasonable 
procedures if it makes an initial report based solely on a register of actions 
(comparable to Washington’s SCOMIS) without further review of the court 
file.238 
Nonetheless, current tenant-screening industry practices appear 
predicated on the assumption that the costs and burdens of reviewing and 
interpreting complete unlawful detainer case files before making tenant-
screening reports would be found to exceed the FCRA reasonableness 
test.239  This precaution would entail both the logistical burden of obtaining 
the relevant documents and require the expertise to properly interpret and 
report the contents.240 Yet, because the potential harm to a rental applicant 
from an incorrect, incomplete, or misleading eviction report is so 
substantial,241 screening services can be expected to incur significant costs 
and burdens to ensure the maximum possible accuracy of those reports.242 
Given the particular need for tenant-screening reports to be accurate the first 
time around, rather than on reinvestigation,243 Washington tenant-screening 
agencies should adequately research and confirm unlawful detainer filings 
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before reporting them to prospective landlords, and any such reports should 
include information favorable to the tenants (such as a positive outcome, 
meritorious defenses, or mitigating facts and circumstances apparent from 
the court documents). 
The omission of case outcomes, mitigating circumstances, and other key 
facts concerning unlawful detainer suits is most defensible in counties that 
do not make superior court documents available online, as the costs and 
delays of obtaining the necessary information are likely greatest where 
access to the relevant records entails a physical visit to a (potentially 
distant) courthouse either by the screening agency itself or through a 
subcontractor.244 But in jurisdictions like King County, where superior court 
records are accessible online at a low cost, the assumption that ascertaining 
and disclosing case dispositions or other details of UD suits (in initial 
tenant-screening reports) would be found to impose an unreasonable burden 
on consumer reporting agencies is highly suspect.245  Also undermining the 
contention that such completeness not feasible in unlawful detainer reports 
is Washington’s Criminal Records Privacy Act, which requires law 
enforcement agencies to report the disposition of an offense whenever a 
nonconviction record of the offense is reported.246 
A less-effective precaution for ensuring the accuracy of eviction records 
would be to cross-reference unlawful detainer records with other materials 
available to the screening service, especially the applicant’s credit report. 
For instance, if the credit report reveals a judgment in favor of the landlord, 
the screening service might justifiably presume the action was resolved 
adversely to the applicant (although this is not always true, as the contents 
of a court order often reflect different results than the title may suggest).247 
Or, if an applicant continued to reside at disputed premises for a significant 
length of time after an unlawful detainer suit—thus, suggesting that the case 
may have been dismissed or otherwise resolved without an eviction—the 
agency may need to conduct a further investigation to prepare a complete 
and accurate report.248 Since a screening agency will almost always obtain 
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an applicant’s credit report anyway (usually for resale as part of the 
screening package), these procedures—albeit imperfect—entail minimal 
cost and effort. 
3. Public Records 
Regardless of the measures tenant-screening services take to ensure the 
accuracy of their reports, true fairness in the rental application process will 
remain elusive absent tighter controls on the creation, storage, and 
dissemination of the public records upon which those screening reports are 
largely based. Much of the information in tenant-screening reports consists 
of repackaged data mined from various public databases, many of which 
were never intended as sources for consumer reports. Once information 
contained in public records—especially judicial records—reaches the public 
domain, there are few effective limits on either a tenant-screening firm’s 
further dissemination or a landlord’s use of that information in choosing 
tenants. Thus, keeping harmful information from reaching the public 
records in the first place or limiting the distribution of such records may be 
the most practical avenue for preserving tenants’ rental-housing prospects. 
a) Nonconviction Criminal Records 
Washington has extensively regulated the dissemination of nonconviction 
criminal records (most notably arrests).249 Generally, a nonconviction 
record may be disseminated only if it “states the disposition of such charge 
to the extent dispositions have been made at the time of the request.”250 
Inaccurate nonconviction records are subject to dispute and correction 
procedures,251 and all such records are deleted after two years.252 Only 
records of convictions “may be disseminated without restriction.”253 These 
rules do not entirely eliminate the risk that a person may be denied housing 
based on an unjustified arrest or unproven criminal charge, but they do 
substantially shorten the duration of time that risk can deny that person 
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housing (as compared with civil litigation records, which may be reported 
for up to seven years).254 
b) Litigation Records (Criminal and Civil) 
Washington courts have the inherent authority to seal judicial records,255 
that is, to “protect [the court file or court record] from examination by the 
public and unauthorized court personnel.”256 This authority extends to all 
judicial records, including criminal cases, civil cases, and even to records of 
conviction for felonies or other serious crimes.257 However, because the 
Washington Constitution expressly protects the openness of judicial 
proceedings, courts exercise the authority to seal court records under only 
very limited circumstances.258 So far, Washington has recognized only two 
such grounds for limiting public access to court proceedings (or records 
thereof): where public access threatens a criminal defendant’s right to a fair 
trial, or where public access unreasonably interferes with a person’s right to 
privacy.259 
Preserving one’s access to rental housing is a privacy interest that can 
establish grounds for sealing a judicial record that diminishes a person’s 
rental prospects.260 Thus, unlawful detainer defendants, criminal defendants, 
and other litigants about whom prejudicial judicial records exist may, in 
some circumstances, obtain orders sealing those records from the public 
view and, by extension, from tenant-screening companies.261 Though a 
promising remedy, the legal standard to secure an order to seal records is 
high, and as it is subject to considerable trial court discretion, may not be 
consistently applied across a range of cases. 
Judicial records may be sealed on privacy grounds only if the proponent 
of sealing demonstrates “compelling privacy or safety concerns that 
outweigh the public’s interest in access to the record.”262 Protecting access 
to rental housing is a compelling concern only if the person shows an actual 
need for rental housing and that sealing the record will materially increase 
his ability to obtain it.263 Even if judicial records are sealed for this reason, 
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the court may only seal the records as narrowly as necessary to achieve the 
privacy-related objective.264 In one recent case, the Washington Court of 
Appeals, Division I, went so far as to suggest that an order to seal the record 
of an improperly filed unlawful detainer action might not be justified if an 
adequate mechanism could be created enabling a tenant to “insert an 
explanation into [SCOMIS] analogous to that which an individual can insert 
into a credit history.”265 
4. Due Process Concerns 
The courts’ reluctance to seal records, coupled with residential landlords’ 
pervasive practice of categorically excluding applicants who have been sued 
for unlawful detainer, raises due process concerns not typical of other 
record-sealing contexts. When simply appearing on a court-maintained list 
of unlawful detainer defendants materially diminishes a person’s rental- 
housing opportunities,266 a rental applicant may be entitled to heightened 
procedural safeguards in seeking removal from that list—or in avoiding 
being named to the list in the first place.267 Also, while unlawful detainer 
defendants are seldom denied fair trials in individual cases by prejudicial 
publicity, the widespread use of SCOMIS as a de facto rental-housing 
blacklist tends collectively to deny tenants equal access to the civil justice 
system. 
Washington courts have yet to grapple with these due process 
considerations, but the solution could be a lessening of the “compelling 
interest” standard applicable to requests sealing unlawful detainer records. 
A criminal defendant who seeks to close a court proceeding or seal a record 
to protect her right to a fair trial need only meet a much lower standard: 
“reasonable possibility of prejudicial publicity.”268 Civil trials generally 
require fewer procedural safeguards than criminal prosecutions, where 
threats of incarceration or other severe punishments loom, but the 
systematic impairment of residential tenants’ due process rights injures not 
only the litigants but also damages the integrity of the tribunal itself. 
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Therefore, sealing certain unlawful detainer records protects the interests of 
both the affected tenants and the courts as well. 
Sealing unlawful detainer records more readily could greatly counteract 
this erosion of judicial access. Giving tenants a reasonable expectation that 
a mere record of an unlawful detainer case filing will not materially 
diminish their future housing prospects, should they prevail or settle on 
favorable terms, could lessen the chilling effect that precludes many from 
asserting and litigating meritorious defenses.269 This could be largely 
accomplished just by redacting the full names of unlawful detainer 
defendants from judicial records, leaving the balance of the court files 
largely intact.270 Such redaction would have no discernable effect on the 
public’s ability to monitor and evaluate the court’s adjudication of cases—
the central function underlying the constitutional mandate that justice be 
administered openly.271 
IV. POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENTS 
As databases merge and the ranks of the “unhouseables” swell, the need 
for new consumer protections respecting the realities of the information age 
could not be more pressing. Four distinct forms of enhanced protections 
appear specifically appropriate.  
First, a practical method for enabling tenants to obtain, review, and  
dispute inaccurate or improper contents in their tenant-screening reports is 
necessary to breathe life into existing Fair Credit Reporting Act protections. 
Second, effective controls on the dissemination and use of information in 
public records and databases, such as SCOMIS, that consumer reporting 
agencies have appropriated and used as de facto credit reports (or 
sometimes blacklists) are in order. Third, tenant-selection criteria that clash 
with important public policy interests should be curtailed. Fourth, some 
mechanism for controlling screening costs is needed to ensure that 
individuals and families with marginal “rent-worthiness” are not steered 
into substandard housing—or denied access altogether—by having to pay 
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multiple times for the same reports. Finally, Washington should either 
devote adequate public resources to meet the housing needs of those 
remaining persons who will inevitably fail the tenant-screening criteria or 
implement measured controls on the exclusionary rental-admissions policies 
of private housing providers.272 
A. Portable Screening Reports 
“Portable” tenant-screening reports (i.e., reports an applicant could reuse 
in applying for housing at successive providers) would appreciably advance 
two of these objectives. Most directly, portable reports would exert 
significant downward pressure on screening costs by enabling applicants to 
pay just one fee per housing search, rather than a separate fee for every 
application. Portable reports could also give tenants a way to monitor their 
reports for accuracy and to meaningfully challenge inappropriate contents 
under the FCRA dispute process. 
Establishing portable screening reports would require only two minor 
legal adjustments. The first would be a law compelling screening services to 
compile and disclose tenant-screening reports at the request of a consumer, 
as at least one Washington tenant-screening company does already.273 This 
would assure renters the ability to obtain their screening reports, review 
them for accuracy, and dispute incorrect items before applying for 
housing,274 when the existing FCRA dispute and reinvestigation may be of 
use.275 
The second factor necessary to make screening reports “portable” would 
be to ensure that housing providers actually accept such tenant-vetted 
reports. Housing providers often form preferences for specific screening 
companies and may be reluctant to accept or use reports from other 
sources.276 As representatives for a major landlord trade association told the 
Washington Legislature in 2009, many landlords also fear that tenant-
supplied reports could be altered or fabricated (a particular concern where 
the tenant may have access to the report before it reaches the landlord).277 
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Prohibiting landlords from obtaining screening reports from their 
preferred sources would likely be unconstitutional. But the Legislature 
could clarify RCW 59.18.257(1) to make clear that a landlord may not 
charge an applicant for a new screening report when a sufficient portable 
report is available for free. If landlords had to choose between relying on 
the portable report or bearing further screening costs themselves, it is 
reasonable to expect that many landlords would accept the portable reports, 
particularly reports created by reputable screening firms. Requiring portable 
screening reports to contain certain basic components (such as a credit 
report, criminal background check, and eviction history), meet minimal 
standards of quality, and be transmitted to housing providers in a manner 
that ensures the reports are not subject to fraud or alteration, could make 
portability a reality.278 
A comprehensive approach to portability was recently proposed in the 
Fair Tenant Screening Act (FTSA), a bill that has steadily gained 
momentum279 since its introduction to the Washington Legislature in the 
2009–2010 biennium.280 Under the FTSA as originally proposed, a 
screening service that receives a fee for issuing a tenant-screening report 
about a specific rental applicant would be obligated to provide copies of 
that same report at no charge “to any prospective landlord who has been 
authorized by the prospective tenant to receive the report” for the sixty-day 
period thereafter.281 To protect landlords from alteration or fraud, a 
screening service would provide the copy directly to the landlord.282 
Another section of the FTSA would prohibit landlords from charging 
tenant-screening costs to any applicant for whom such a free report was 
available—provided the report is a “comprehensive screening report,” 
which the bill defines as a report containing the applicant’s “criminal 
history,” “eviction history,” and “credit report.”283 
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B. Enhanced Controls on Dissemination of Civil Litigation Records 
Washington currently does very little to restrict public access to civil 
litigation records or to control dissemination of such records, and virtually 
nothing to limit the end use of such information. Yet, even true and accurate 
information in civil litigation records—unlawful detainer records, in 
particular—can be, and often is, used to deny housing in ways that are 
unfair to the applicant or that undermine public policy. Keeping unlawful 
detainer records, as well as other damaging civil litigation records (e.g., 
domestic violence protection order cases or rent collection lawsuits), from 
reaching prospective landlords and tenant-screening companies would be 
the most effective response to this problem of unfair or socially deleterious 
use. Even a narrow provision enabling persons with undeserved eviction 
histories to more readily seal unlawful detainer records (including from 
SCOMIS itself) could prevent many unjust housing denials and restore 
much of the procedural fairness that the screening industry’s exploitation of 
judicial records has eroded. 
Such a mechanism would need two key features to be effective. First, the 
prospect of obtaining an order to seal the necessary court records must be 
virtually ensured for cases in which the tenant prevails or settles on 
favorable terms. A tenuous prospect of sealing one’s name is unlikely to 
diminish the chilling effect that blacklisting (via unlawful detainer 
registries) exerts on a tenants considering whether to litigate unlawful 
detainer actions. Second, the provision must close any “back doors” through 
which housing providers and screening services might obtain the sealed 
information.284 This would include language relieving applicants from 
having to disclose sealed case information on rental applications, as well as 
a restriction against reporting sealed case information remaining in private 
“shadow” databases. 
The version of the FTSA bill introduced in the Washington Senate 
contained a record-sealing proposal that would have lessened the standard 
for sealing or redacting unlawful detainer records in specified circumstances 
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where limiting public access would promote the public interest.285 These 
included cases that were settled or where the tenant prevailed, cases filed 
against tenants whose landlords had recently lost the properties in 
foreclosure, and cases based on nonpayment of rent where the tenant 
“reinstates” the tenancy (by paying the arrearage and any associated costs, 
fees, or other court-awarded sums within five days after judgment).286 Upon 
a showing that such a circumstance existed, a rebuttable presumption would 
arise that protecting the tenant’s housing prospects is more important than 
allowing unfettered public access to the case records.287 Unless rebutted by 
facts peculiar to that case, this presumption would establish grounds for 
sealing the records necessary to preserve the tenant’s rental opportunities.288 
California, taking an even more aggressive approach to this problem, 
“masks” the filing of unlawful detainer cases automatically and unseals 
those records only if the landlord is found to be the prevailing party.289 The 
California statute may be more advantageous to tenants in that the masking 
occurs automatically and in all cases. However, the parties have less control 
over the administration of the masking, which may expose tenants to 
bureaucratic errors or delays and make such problems more difficult to 
correct than the litigant-directed process envisioned by the FTSA. More 
significantly, California’s wholesale removal of unlawful detainer records 
from public view may be unconstitutional in Washington.290 
C. Fair Credit Reporting Act Amendments 
Washington could further improve fairness for rental-housing seekers by 
improving its Fair Credit Reporting Act. Milder improvements—such as 
expressly requiring the inclusion of favorable information and more 
complete disclosure of facts, circumstances, and outcomes of civil cases in 
tenant-screening reports—could improve the overall accuracy of the 
information used in rental decisions. Regular access to more complete 
information might induce some housing providers to adopt more nuanced 
tenant-selection policies. A stronger approach would be to restrict CRAs 
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from reporting even certain true and accurate unlawful detainer filings, such 
as cases brought for retaliatory or other illegitimate purposes, or where the 
tenant prevailed, or where the court lacked jurisdiction. Public policy 
interests could support limitations on reporting unlawful detainers involving 
post-foreclosure evictions or—in view of the due process considerations 
implicated by unlawful detainer reports—cases dismissed or settled before 
adjudication. 
Consistent with the latter approach, the proposed FTSA would have 
prohibited tenant-screening services from reporting several types of 
unlawful detainer suits, including cases in which the tenant was not found 
“guilty of unlawful detainer or otherwise in unlawful possession of the 
premises, post-foreclosure evictions, or judgments that were vacated, 
expunged, or sealed.”291 The FTSA would also have precluded reporting 
“qualified victim protection records,” which encompassed various “records 
or information indicating that the person, about whom the records or 
information pertains, is a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, or 
stalking, or protected by a court order.”292 
1. Free Speech Considerations 
In 1992, California passed legislation prohibiting CRAs from reporting 
any unlawful detainer actions except those in which the tenant lost.293 A 
landlord association and a tenant-screening company challenged the statute, 
and a trial court held it unconstitutional on the grounds that “it prohibit[ed] 
truthful reporting of ‘information contained in court files that are fully 
available to the public and which can be freely reported and copied by any 
other person, entity or member of the media.’”294 A division of the 
California Court of Appeals upheld the ruling in U.D. Registry v. State of 
California (hereafter “U.D. Registry I”), concluding that “[o]nce true 
information is disclosed in public court documents open to public 
inspection, the press [or other members of the public] cannot be sanctioned 
for publishing it.”295 Because the proposed FTSA would, likewise, enact 
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new limitations on the dissemination of information in the public domain 
(by commercial tenant-screening companies), similar constitutional 
questions may also arise in connection with Washington’s tenant-screening 
legislation.296 
A crucial factor in the outcome of U.D. Registry I was the court’s 
determination that unlawful detainer information in tenant-screening reports 
did not constitute commercial speech.297 Content-based regulations of 
commercial speech are analyzed under a four-step test established by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. 
Public Service Commission of New York.298 Under Central Hudson, 
commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection only if it 
concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.299 The government bears the 
burden of justifying the restriction300 and will succeed only if the regulation 
directly advances a substantial government interest and is no more 
extensive than necessary to serve that interest.301 Having found the 
regulated speech at issue (i.e., the contents of tenant-screening reports) not 
to have been commercial speech, however, the U.D. Registry I court applied 
the much more rigorous strict scrutiny, under which a restriction on speech 
is presumed unconstitutional “absent a need to further a state interest of the 
highest order.”302 
Despite finding that “[c]oncern about the availability of rental housing 
for those needing housing, and particularly those facing eviction, is a valid 
and significant state interest,” the U.D. Registry I court struck down the 
California statute, finding it did “not justify a ban on publication by credit 
reporting agencies of lawfully obtained truthful information contained in 
court records open to the perusal of everyone.”303 Viewed in isolation, U.D. 
Registry I casts a dark cloud over Washington’s ability to improve its own 
FCRA. Indeed, the regulations concerning the inclusion of certain unlawful 
detainer and victim protection records proposed in the FTSA304 are 
substantially similar to the restrictions that the U.D. Registry I court 
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declared unconstitutional.305 In its proper context, however, U.D. Registry I 
is an outlier that has since been called into serious question.306 
In 2002, California adopted additional “security freeze” provisions to its 
state fair credit reporting act because of heightened concerns regarding 
identity theft.307 The security freeze provision authorized a consumer to 
place a note in her credit report that would “prohibit [a CRA] from releasing 
the consumer’s credit report or any information from it without the express 
authorization of the consumer.”308 Once again, U.D. Registry brought a 
constitutional challenge to the statute.309 This time, however, a different 
division of the California Court of Appeals ruled, in U.D. Registry II, that 
the question of “whether the expression proposes a commercial transaction 
is no longer the sole standard of First Amendment review [and that] there is 
no single bright line test for defining commercial speech.”310 This 
conclusion directly contravened the U.D. Registry I court, which had 
declared that “truthful information, taken from public records regarding 
unlawful detainer defendants, does not propose a commercial transaction 
and, hence, is not commercial speech.”311 
Reviewing both California and U.S. Supreme Court precedents, the U.D. 
Registry II court further noted that the contents of tenant-screening reports 
could be considered “commercial speech” under cases extending the term’s 
definition beyond language proposing commercial transactions to reach 
such things as an alcohol-content label on beer bottles or a statement on an 
attorney’s letterhead indicating the lawyer was a CPA.312 With “ambiguities 
exist[ing] at the margins of what may be categorized as commercial 
speech,” the U.D. Registry II court opted to evaluate the security freeze 
statute under intermediate (Central Hudson) scrutiny.313 Ironically, the 
security freeze law then failed to survive under intermediate scrutiny, 
leading the U.D. Registry II court to leave undecided whether the contents 
of a consumer report are indeed commercial speech.314 
Thus, additional restrictions that Washington might place on permissible 
contents of tenant-screening reports would likely survive a constitutional 
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challenge because tenant-screening reports very likely do constitute 
commercial speech. Being speech of a purely private nature and not 
concerning matters of public importance, a tenant-screening report warrants 
“significantly less constitutional interest.”315 A tenant screening report does 
not itself propose a commercial transaction, but is closely related to a 
proposed commercial transaction and is certainly “expression related solely 
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”316 Regulating 
screening reports is consistent with the government’s interest in protecting 
the public against unfair business practices.317 The U.D. Registry II court, 
which itself tilted toward—though stopping short of—finding that all 
consumer reports are commercial speech, observed that numerous federal 
courts have already determined that the contents of consumer reports are 
commercial speech and treated them as such.318 Assuming Washington 
follows U.D. Registry II and the greater weight of authority in concluding 
that tenant-screening reports are indeed commercial speech, then new 
restrictions on their contents would merit intermediate (Central Hudson) 
scrutiny, not the strict scrutiny to which the regulations challenged in U.D. 
Registry I were subjected.319 
Carefully drawn restrictions on the reporting of unlawful detainer actions, 
victim-protection records, and other civil litigation materials could easily 
survive a review under intermediate scrutiny. The government has a 
substantial interest in preventing applicants from being unfairly denied 
access to rental housing, 320 and regulating unlawful detainer reports would 
directly advance that interest. Other substantial interests, such as preserving 
the due process rights of residential tenants or deterring retaliation (e.g., 
against tenants who demand repairs or lodge complaints about their 
landlords), could also sustain such a regulation—while these interests 
would be advanced somewhat less directly, the government need only 
“demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in 
fact alleviate them to a material degree.”321 
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Taking a lesson from U.D. Registry II, Washington could ensure that its 
regulation is narrowly tailored by limiting the reporting of only certain 
“unfair” court records, rather than extending such restrictions to all eviction 
suits (or beyond specific well-drawn categories), and applying the 
restrictions only where the records are sought for tenant-screening purposes 
(rather than all consumer or employment transactions).322 Laws prohibiting 
tenant-screening companies from reporting information (including court 
records) in a false or misleading manner would receive no constitutional 
protection at all under Central Hudson.323 
The proposed FTSA would appear to survive constitutional review with 
respect to its limitations on both unlawful detainer reports, as discussed 
above, as well as “qualified victim-protection records.”324 The restrictions 
are narrowly drawn; the same government interest in preventing applicants 
from being unfairly denied access to rental housing pertains to both victim-
protection records and select unlawful detainer records.325 Prohibiting the 
reporting of victim-protection records also advances substantial government 
interests in protecting privacy rights and reducing violence against women. 
2. Preemption 
A state attempting to regulate tenant-screening reports could also face a 
potential preemption problem arising under the federal FCRA,326 a 
provision of which prohibits any state from making a post-1996 law “with 
respect to any subject matter regulated under . . . section 1681c of [Title 15 
U.S.C.] relating to information contained in consumer reports.”327 In turn, 
section 1681c prohibits CRAs from reporting “[c]ivil suits, civil judgments, 
and records of arrest that, from date of entry, antedate the report by more 
than seven years or until the governing statute of limitations has expired, 
whichever is the longer period.”328 
Because unlawful detainer actions are a type of civil suit, if the reporting 
of civil suits is a “subject matter regulated under section 1681c,”329 then a 
new state law regulation on the reporting of civil suits would be 
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preempted.330 This contention appears highly plausible at first blush, 
because many CRAs operate nationally, and Congress may have intended to 
create a national standard for what can and cannot be included in a 
consumer report.331 But this preemption argument rests on a flawed 
premise. 
The congressional intent behind section 1681c(a) was to prevent CRAs 
from reporting outdated information.332 The statute prescribes various time 
limits beyond which even true and accurate information cannot be 
reported—including civil suits and judgments older than seven years.333 
Hence, the “subject matter regulated” under section 1681c(a) is the duration 
for which certain information can be reported before it must be deleted due 
to outdatedness. Advocates of the preemption claim turn section 1681c(a) 
on its head, construing the rule as an implicit authorization to report any and 
all civil suits and judgments that are not outdated. Yet section 1681c does 
not actually authorize CRAs to report anything; it simply specifies some 
items that cannot be reported.334 
The possibility that Congress intended section 1681c to implicitly 
authorize CRAs to report any information not specifically prohibited therein 
is rebutted by the fact that section 1681c is not the only part of the FCRA 
that restricts CRAs from reporting certain types of information. Under 
section 1681i(a)(5), for instance, a civil suit or judgment cannot be 
reported—even if true, accurate, and less than seven years old—unless it 
can be verified upon reinvestigation.335 Indeed, the lack of a conflict 
between sections 1681c and 1681i, either of which might forbid the 
reporting of information permitted by the other, reinforces the conclusion 
that the “subject matter regulated” by section 1681c is the time for which 
credit information remains current, not whether specific types of 
information (e.g., civil suits and judgments) may be reported at all.336 
As laws restricting CRAs from reporting information on grounds other 
than outdatedness do not regulate the same subject matter as section 
1681c(a), such restrictions that originate from state or local enactments are 
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not preempted by section 1681t(b).337 Consistent with this view, some other 
states have enacted laws either restricting CRAs from reporting true, 
nonoutdated information or governing the manner in which such 
information may be reported.338 
CONCLUSION 
Tenant-screening is, ultimately, a response to the inherent risks of leasing 
residential housing. It cannot be denied that some tenants will inevitably 
default in rent, damage the rental premises, violate criminal laws, or have 
other negative effects if admitted. Unsuccessful tenancies carry adverse 
economic repercussions, which landlords naturally seek to avoid. Tenant 
screening that accurately predicts which applicants are more or less likely to 
become successful tenants can lessen these risks. This undeniable economic 
justification makes tenant-screening difficult, if not impossible, to ever 
condemn absolutely. But while it may be the prerogative of housing 
providers to choose their tenants carefully, this does not mean tenant-
screening must persistently trump other overriding public interests. 
Fair housing laws, which prohibit only the most insufferable forms of 
tenant-selection criteria, establish that housing providers have no 
inalienable right to choose tenants on whatever grounds they prefer.339 But 
the exclusion of tenants for other arbitrary reasons (i.e., besides membership 
in established protected classes) can also produce socially deleterious 
effects. The most significant of these adverse consequences include 
undermining the integrity of unlawful detainer courts and creating a pool of 
individuals and families lacking realistic access to rental housing. Even 
federally-subsidized public housing—in many communities the housing of 
last resort for the indigent and disabled—“[p]reclud[es] admission of 
applicants whose habits and practices reasonably may be expected to have a 
detrimental effect on the residents or the project environment.”340 This is 
perhaps only common sense; yet, one can only wonder how policies such as 
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this can be reconciled with other policy goals, such as the state’s laudable 
pledge to “end homelessness in Washington by July 15, 2015.”341 
A well-conceived regulatory scheme could appreciably reduce the extent 
to which tenant-screening contributes to homelessness and other social ills, 
especially where the method of exclusion inflicts the social harms without 
even producing a correspondingly material reduction in the housing 
provider’s risk. The first step in such a scheme would be to ensure that 
rental decisions are made using transparent criteria that are reasonably 
related to predicting an applicant’s future performance as a tenant. The best 
way to promote transparency would be for housing providers to establish 
written, binding tenant-selection criteria and inform rejected applicants of 
the reasons for denials or other adverse decisions. Practical legal remedies 
for applicants who are rejected on grounds inconsistent with such written 
policies could give teeth to such a requirement. A second tier of regulations 
could then prohibit rental criteria lacking some minimal degree of 
predictive value (as to the applicant’s future performance in a tenancy) or 
criteria that conflicts with public policy goals—one of which must 
eventually include ending homelessness.342 
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69 See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 24 (“The more identifiers that are attached to a 
record, the easier it is for tenant screening agencies to access the information and provide 
accurate information on an applicant.”); see CMTY. LEGAL SERVS., supra note 36, at 8. 
70 See WASHINGTON STATE, supra note 54. 
71 Testimony of Barbara Miner, King County Clerk, Washington House Judiciary 
Committee, June 8, 2010, available at 
http://www.tvw.org/media/mediaplayer.cfm?evid=2010060031B&TYPE=V&CFID=781
0673&CFTOKEN=13413583&bhcp&bhcp=1. 
72 See WATCH, supra note 37 (“[We] cannot guarantee the records you obtain through 
this site relate to the person on whom you are seeking information. Searches based on 
names and other identifiers are not always accurate. The only way to positively link 
someone to a criminal record is through fingerprint verification.”). 
73 Case Number/Case Name Search - Terms and Conditions, SUPERIOR COURT 
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM, 
http://dw.courts.wa.gov/?fa=home.casesearchTerms (last visited Aug. 12, 2009). 
74 CMTY. LEGAL SERVS., supra note 36, at 9. 
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75 See White v. First Am. Registry, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 1611(LAK), 2007 WL 703926, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007) (tenant screening company “defendants have seized upon the 
ready and cheap availability of electronic records to create and market a product that can 
be, and probably is, used to victimize blameless individuals . . . The fact that defendants 
are willing, indeed anxious, to engage in activities that are bound to harm innocent people 
is distressing.”); see also HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 23–25. 
76 See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 23–24. 
77 See Trujillo v. First Am. Registry, Inc., 157 Cal. App.4th 628, 733–34 (Cal. Ct. app. 
2007) (rental applicant who had prevailed in prior unlawful detainer action checked “no” 
box on application asking if he had “ever had an unlawful detainer action filed against 
[him]” rejected for misrepresentation on application); see also State v. McEnry, 103 P.3d 
857, 859 (Wash. 2004) (contemplating the prospect that a person with a vacated criminal 
conviction may be denied rental housing due to an appearance of non-disclosure or false 
information on the application). 
78 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.005 (1993). 
79 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(f) (1998); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.010(5) (1993). 
80 15 U.S.C. § 1681(i) (1998); WASH. REV. CODE §19.182.090 (1993). 
81 15 U.S.C. § 1681(i) (1998); WASH. REV. CODE §19.182.090 (1993). 
82 15 U.S.C. § 1681(i) (1998); WASH. REV. CODE §19.182.090 (1993). 
83 E-OSCAR, http://209.34.249.149/about.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2010). 
84 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(D) (1994) (“Any consumer-reporting agency that compiles and 
maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis shall implement an automated system 
through which furnishers of information to that consumer reporting agency may report 
the results of a reinvestigation that finds incomplete or inaccurate information in a 
consumer’s file to other such consumer reporting agencies.”). 
85 Id.; see About E-OSCAR, EOSCAR, http://209.34.249.149/about.htm (last visited Oct. 
5, 2010). 
86 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(p) (2003); § 1681i(a)(5)(D) (1994). 
87 § 1681i(a)(5)(D) (1994); § 1681s(2) (1996) (discussing “furnisher duties”). 
88 A Google search for “tenant screening Washington State” on Aug. 12, 2009, returned 
52,000 hits, including links to more than forty websites of companies offering tenant-
screening services in Washington. Some representative sites included: 
www.infocubic.com, www.screeningworks.com, www.evictionrecords.com, 
www.calleleanore.com, www.rentlaw.com, www.uslandlord.com, www.E-Renter.com, 
www.megascreening.com, www.criminalbackgroundrecords.com, 
www.landlord411.com, rentalexpress.com, www.TenantScreening.net , 
www.mypropertyguard.com, www.manta.com, www.cibackgrounds.com, and others. 
Interestingly, this search did not turn up links to the websites of some of Washington’s 
most prolific tenant-screening agencies, such as On-Site Manager, Inc., Orca 
Information, Inc., or the Rental Housing Association of Puget Sound. 
89 See accord Cox v. St. Owner, L.P., No. 114062/08, 2009 WL 2986667, at *2 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Aug. 27, 2009) (“The blacklisting effect that may result from [New York State 
Office of Court Administration’s] practice of selling data to tenant screening bureaus 
[TSBs] is a realistic concern for prospective tenants. . . Realizing that there are numerous 
TSBs, this court acknowledges that prospective tenants are still faced with the possibility 
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of being blacklisted when seeking accommodations.”); see also Fact Sheet 6b: ‘Other’ 
Consumer Reports: What You Should Know About Specialty Consumer Reports, 
PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, §6 (Nov. 2008), http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs6b-
SpecReports.htm (“Consumers may have a particularly difficult time exercising their 
right to a free specialty report when the ‘specialty’ market is saturated with agencies. 
This may prove to be the case for tenants who want to check their file.”). 
90 See PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 89, at § 3 (“[consumer] ‘report’ is the 
document provided to the employer, landlord, insurer or creditor. The report reflects 
information collected and compiled at any given time. Your ‘file’ on the other hand is the 
information the consumer reporting agency maintains about you. Your right to a free 
disclosure is to your ‘file,’ not your ‘report.’). 
91 See id. 
92 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) (1994) (Consumer Reporting Agency (CRA) must, on 
request, “clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer: (1) All information in the 
consumer’s file at the time of the request) (emphasis added); accord WASH. REV. CODE § 
19.182.070 (1993). 
93 See Wilson v. Rental Research Servs., Inc., 165 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1999). 
94 See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(1) (1991); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 
19.182.110(2) (1993); 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)(2)(A) (1996). 
95 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(b) (1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.100(2) (1993). 
96 See Wilson, 165 F.3d at 646 (“Because landlords need to fill units promptly, by the 
time a tenant screening report is corrected, the unit is often rented.”). 
97 See PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 89, §6. See generally Jacklet, supra 
note 5. 
98 See Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Williams v. 
Colonial Bank, 826 F. Supp. 415, 418 (M.D.Ala. 1993) (“A credit reporting agency has 
no duty, as a part of its reinvestigation, to go behind public records to check for accuracy 
or completeness when a consumer is essentially collaterally attacking the underlying 
credit information.”)).  But see Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 287–88 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (“[A] credit reporting agency may initially rely on public court documents, 
because to require otherwise would be burdensome and inefficient. However, such 
exclusive reliance may not be justified once the credit reporting agency receives notice 
that the consumer disputes information contained in his credit report. When a credit 
reporting agency receives such notice, it can target its resources in a more efficient 
manner and conduct a more thorough investigation.”). 
99See Jacklet, supra note 5 (“tenants often pay for three or four (supposedly) different 
credit checks each time they move); see BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, supra note 23, at 2; see also Schoendorf v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 313, 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“UDR typically provides its subscribers with consumer 
reports consisting of a standard credit report from one or more of the three major credit 
bureaus (Trans Union, Experian, and Equifax) and public record information that is 
gathered by its own employees from a review of court records regarding evictions, 
property damage cases, rent cases, foreclosures, and bankruptcies.”). 
100  Testimony of Jonathan Grant, Washington House Committee on Financial Institution 
& Insurance Regarding HB 2622 (Jan. 25, 2010), available at 
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101 See note for Grant, supra note 4. See generally Jacklet, supra note 5. 
102 See generally Jacklet, supra note 5. 
103 See generally id. 
104 See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(1) (1991) (stating that landlord may charge actual 
costs of obtaining background information about prospective tenants, whether from a 
screening service or through the landlord’s own activities). 
105 See Claudia Coulton, Brett Theodos, & Margery A. Turner, Family Mobility and 
Neighborhood Change: New Evidence and Implications for Community Initiatives, 
URBAN INST., 20–23 (Nov. 2009), 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411973_family_mobility.pdf (discussing patterns of 
family relocation in the White Center neighborhood of Seattle as a possible “comfort 
zone” for low-income families); see also Rogers, supra note 49 (quoting leasing 
professionals who recommend that renters with blemished credit or rental history seek 
housing from “less-selective” landlords). 
106 See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 18 (“screening agencies also use statistical scoring 
models which predict future financial risk based upon characteristics of their past 
behavior.”). 
107 See generally RENTAL HOUS. ASS’N, supra note 24. 
108 Id. 
109 See Wilson v. Rental Research Servs., Inc., 165 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(“Landlords have little incentive to verify ‘possible’ negative information, since they 
have the option of simply choosing another prospective tenant who has no negative 
information.”). See generally Rogers, supra note 49 (“Landlords can afford to be picky, 
because vacancy rates have lurked beneath 1 percent for a year.”).  See also 
HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 12 (“An extremely tight rental market in the Twin Cities 
exacerbated the issues cited in the analysis of impediments.”). 
110 See also U.D. Registry, Inc. v. State, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (Cal. App. 4th, 1995) 
(discussing legislative findings in support of California statute which provided that 
“inappropriate inclusion of information about unlawful detainer actions results in ‘tenant 
blacklisting’ and imposes an unfair and unnecessary hardship on tenants seeking rental 
housing” and quoting report of the California Senate Committee on Judiciary regarding 
AB 1796 of 1991) [hereinafter U.D. Registry Div. 4]; see White v. First Am. Registry, 
Inc., No. 04 Civ. 1611(LAK), 2007 WL 703926, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007) (“This 
lawsuit arises by reason of the nature of defendants' business, which consists of selling 
landlords the opportunity to consult a list of individuals who have been involved in 
landlord-tenant litigation. As defendants doubtless well understand, risk averse landlords 
are all too willing to use defendants' product as a blacklist, refusing to rent to anyone 
whose name appears on it regardless of whether the existence of a litigation history in 
fact evidences characteristics that would make one an undesirable tenant.”); see also 
Gary Williams, Can Government Limit Tenant Blacklisting?, 24 SW. U.L. REV. 1077, 
1080 (1995) (“Today landlords refuse to rent to persons identified as defendants in 
unlawful detainer actions, regardless of the outcome of the litigation.”) (citing Barela v. 
Superior Court, 636 P.2d 582, 583 (Cal. 1981)). 
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111 See U.D. Registry Div. 4, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 231; Pultz v. Economakis, No. 
114915/2004, 2005 WL 1845635, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2005); Wallace Oman, The 
Need for Masking Court Unlawful Detainer Records, S.F. APT. MAG. (July 2008), 
http://www.sfaa.org/july2008/0807oman.html. 
112 See, e.g., Save Harlem v. Pinnacle Grp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 499, 504 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(discussing claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(c) (1970), that property management enterprise “create[d] a climate of fear and 
intimidation aimed at making tenants afraid to exercise their legal rights or object to 
defendants’ conduct by (1) using the existence of ‘blacklisting’ . . . ‘a practice where 
commercial tenant screening bureaus purchase electronic housing court case data[,] use 
this data to prepare so-called ‘tenant screening reports’ based on that data, and then sell 
such reports to prospective landlords.”). 
113 See Testimony of Jonathan Grant, supra note 100; see generally Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Solid Ground, Indigo Real Estate Servs. v. Rousey, 215 P.3d 977 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2009) (“Many of our clients who are housed report to Solid Ground housing counselors 
that they are not able to assert their rights because the landlord threatens to file an 
eviction lawsuit against them. Tenants cannot realistically access their legal remedies or 
assert other rights for fear of this type of retaliation . . . . Many renters report to me that if 
they move out before the filing, at least they will have a clean record to seek housing 
later.”); see also Regina Wagner, et al., Regional Analysis of Impediments to Fair 
Housing, WASHINGTON COUNTY, at 160 (May 2001), 
http://www.co.washington.mn.us/client_files/documents/css/CSS_CDBG/CSS--
2001_Analysis_of_Impediments.pdf (“The negative impact of an eviction is so great that 
many tenants have become increasingly reluctant to enforce any of their rights for fear 
that an owner will retaliate and file an eviction proceeding, which would impact their 
housing choices for the next seven years.”). 
114 See accord Pultz, 2005 WL 1845635, at *7 (granting preliminary injunction to stop 
landlords from filing unlawful detainer actions against tenants in part because “there are 
now various credit agencies whose primary business is to report to landlord subscribers, 
the names of all tenants who have appeared in the computer indices of Housing Court, no 
matter whether they were the petitioner or respondent and without regard to whether they 
were successful in their proceedings. This ‘blacklist’ makes the finding of a rental 
apartment potentially very difficult if not impossible . . .As plaintiffs are tenants of 
relatively modest means, the possibility of winding up on a blacklist should they 
ultimately lose, would be devastating.”). 
115 Id. In Washington, the superior court rules enable a landlord to commence an unlawful 
detainer action by service of an unfiled summons and complaint. See WASH. CR 3(a) (“a 
civil action is commenced by service of a copy of a summons together with a copy of a 
complaint . . . or by filing a complaint.”) (emphasis added). The complaint need only be 
filed if the defendant responds to the summons.  
116 See Rudy Kleysteuber, Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal to 
Protect Public Records, 116 YALE L.J. 1344, 1363 (2007); see also Rogers, supra note 49 
(“‘if their dispute has escalated to going to court, an owner will view them as a pain,’ said 
Jake Harrington, a founder of On-Site.com.”). 
Background Checks and Social Effects  383 
VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 1 • 2010 
 
117 See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.240 (2010) (“So long as the tenant is in compliance 
with [the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (RLTA)], the landlord shall not take or 
threaten to take reprisals or retaliatory action against the tenant because of any good faith 
and lawful: (1) Complaints or reports by the tenant to a governmental authority 
concerning the failure of the landlord to substantially comply with any code, statute, 
ordinance, or regulation governing the maintenance or operation of the premises, if such 
condition may endanger or impair the health or safety of the tenant; or (2) Assertions or 
enforcement by the tenant of his rights and remedies under [the RLTA].”). 
118 See generally B.R.U.S.H. v. Pinnacle Grp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 499, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
119 See generally White v. First Am. Registry, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 1611(LAK), 2007 WL 
703926 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007); Schoendorf v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6. See Testimony of Jonathan Grant, 
supra note 100. 
120 See Rogers, supra note 49. 
121 See generally Testimony of Jonathan Grant, supra note 100. 
122 See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 40 (“the increasingly popular use of tenant 
screening reports has resulted in a new class of people who are unable to access rental 
housing because of past credit problems, evictions, poor rental histories or criminal 
backgrounds.”); see also Pultz v. Economakis, No. 114915/2004, 2005 WL 1845635, at 
*7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2005) (“This ‘blacklist’ potentially makes the finding of a 
rental apartment potentially very difficult if not impossible.”). 
123 See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 7 (emphasis added). 
124 See Testimony of Jonathan Grant, supra note 100 (“The creation of a permanent 
eviction record made publicly available on the SCOMIS database is one of the primary 
reasons why many of our clients are denied housing and their homelessness is 
perpetuated.”). 
125 See Carlile v. Harbor Homes, Inc., 194 P.3d 280, 290–91 (Wash. App. 2008) (“The 
duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract [and] requires only that the 
parties perform in good faith the obligations imposed by their agreement.”). 
126 See generally Simon v. D. Miller & Assoc., P.L.L.C., No. 14-07-00894-CV, 2009 WL 
335068 (Tex. App. Feb. 12, 2009) (discussing legal malpractice action against attorney 
whose procedural errors led to dismissal of plaintiff’s claim that his application to rent an 
apartment had been “improperly [sic] rejected for lack of a current W–2 form after he 
was told by a leasing agent that the lack of a W–2 would not cause a problem.”). See also 
Collard v. Reagan, No. 26410-2-II, 2002 WL 1357052, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. June 21, 
2002). 
127 See generally Riss v. Angel, 934 P.2d 669, 680 (Wash. 1997) (party’s rejection of 
another’s performance under a satisfaction contract will be upheld only if the decision is 
reasonable and made in good faith). 
128 See Crafts v. Pitts, 162 P.3d 382, 386–88 (Wash. 2007) (“No piece of land has its 
counterpart anywhere else and it is impossible to duplicate by the expenditure of any 
amount of money” (quoting Carpenter v. Folkerts, 627 P.2d 559, 561 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1981)). 
129 See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.110 (1993); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 
59.18.257(3) (1991). But see 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(b) (1996) (Establishing that if the 
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source of the information that leads to a rejection is a person other than a CRA, then the 
FCRA requires the landlord to inform the denied applicant of the right to obtain the 
reason for denial. On request of the applicant, landlord must also inform the applicant of 
the right to learn the reason for denial at the time the denial is communicated to the 
applicant). 
130 Id. 
131 See generally HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 39–40. 
132 Cf. Egbert v. Way, 546 P.2d 1246, 1248–49 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (“[D]enial of 
specific performance is proper where enforcement is unreasonably difficult or would 
require such long continued supervision by the court as is disproportionate to the 
advantages to be gained.”). 
133 See Crafts, 162 P.3d at 387. 
134 Weissman v. Safeco Ins. Co., 236 P.3d 240, 242 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (“Under the 
American rule on fees in civil cases, which Washington follows, civil litigants are 
responsible for paying their own attorney fees and costs absent specific statutory 
authority, contractual provision, or recognized grounds in equity” (citing Wagner v. 
Foote, 908 P.2d 884, 888 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)). 
135 WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.430 (1973) (“All provisions of [RLTA] shall apply to any 
lease or periodic tenancy entered into on or subsequent to July 16, 1973.”). 
136 WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.580(1) (2004) (“A landlord may not . . . refuse to enter into 
a rental agreement based on the tenant's or applicant's or a household member's status as 
a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking.”). 
137 Stephanus v. Anderson, 613 P.2d 533, 537 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (duty of good faith 
did not preclude retaliatory eviction of tenant). But see Ethridge v. Hwang, 20 P.3d 958, 
962–64 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (mobile home park’s refusal, “on idiosyncratic, frivolous, 
unreasonable, and unlawful grounds” to permit sale of mobile home to prospective buyer 
be actionable under Mobile Home Landlord Tenant Act duty of good faith). 
138 See, e.g., Truly v. Hueft, 158 P.3d 1276, 1281 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). But see Carlile, 
194 P.3d at 290–91 (stating that the duty of good faith does not “inject substantive terms 
into the parties' contract.”). 
139 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (1961) (“Unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared 
unlawful.”); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (1961) (remedies). 
140 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (2009). 
141 See generally Allen v. Am. Land Research, 631 P.2d 930 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981). 
142 See Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co., 204 P.3d 885, 889–90 (Wash. 2009). 
143 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (2009). 
144 Cotton v. Kronenberg, 44 P.3d 878, 886 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (whether a practice 
“impacts the public interest” is usually also a question of fact, but generally turns on 
factors like whether the acts took place in the course of the defendant’s business, whether 
the defendant advertised to the general public, whether the defendant actively solicited 
the plaintiff or others, and whether the defendant occupied a superior bargaining position 
to the plaintiff). 
145 State v. Schwab, 693 P.2d 108, 110 (Wash. 1985) (“Residential landlord-tenant 
problems are within the express purview of the [RLTA] and we perceive the legislature's 
Background Checks and Social Effects  385 
VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 1 • 2010 
 
intent to clearly be that violations of that act do not also constitute violations of the 
Consumer Protection Act.”). 
146 Id. at 113–15. Since Schwab precludes enforcement of the RLTA via the CPA, it is 
fairly certain that a rental applicant cannot invoke the CPA remedies clause to enforce a 
violation of the RLTA duty of good faith under the per se doctrine. 
147 See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.030(13) (1973) (defining “tenant”); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 59.18.060 (1973) (duties of landlords); WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.130 (1973) (duties 
of tenants). 
148 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 59.18.253, 257 (1991). 
149 WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.253 (1991) (“Deposit to secure occupancy by tenant—
Landlord's duties—Violation”). 
150 See id. (“Deposit to secure occupancy by tenant—Landlord's duties—Violation”). 
151 See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.253 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257 (1991); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.570 (2004). 
152
 See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.253(3) (1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(4) 
(1991). 
153  Graffell v. Honeysuckle, 191 P.2d 858, 863–64 (Wash. 1948) (“[I]n enacting 
legislation upon a particular subject, the lawmaking body is presumed to be familiar not 
only with its own prior legislation relating to that subject, but also with the court 
decisions construing such former legislation.”). 
154 See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.253, c 194 § 2 (1991) (“The legislature finds that 
tenant application fees often have the effect of excluding low-income people from 
applying for housing because many low-income people cannot afford these fees in 
addition to the rent and other deposits which may be required. The legislature further 
finds that application fees are frequently not returned to unsuccessful applicants for 
housing, which creates a hardship on low-income people.”). 
155 See id. 
156
 See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.580(1) (2004). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at  § 59.18.580(2). 
159 Id. 
160 See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030(3) (2010). 
161 See Collard v. Reagan, No. 26410-2-II, 2002 WL 1357052, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. 
June 21, 2002) (plaintiffs and “[s]everal other witnesses also testified at trial regarding 
their dealings with Reagan. They related almost identical stories: seeing a newspaper 
advertisement for a rental house; contacting Reagan and completing an application; 
paying the credit check fee; Reagan's calling to say that they were approved and that they 
needed to pay a deposit; submitting the deposit; and Reagan's refusing to rent the house 
or refund the deposit.”). 
162 Id. at *3 (“By not apprising the trial court that the complaint potentially alleged a 
violation of the wrong statute and instead defending under the CPA, Reagan waived his 
right to assert later that the CPA was not the proper statute to apply.”). 
163 See Ethridge v. Hwang, 20 P.3d 958, 965 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
164 Id. at 964; see also Holiday Park Cmty. Ass’n v. Echo Lake Assocs., L.L.C., 135 P.3d 
499, 503 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (holding mobile home park tenant organization and 
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individual mobile home park owners had standing to bring CPA action against park 
management). 
165 See Eifler v. Shurgard Capital, 861 P.2d 1071, 1078 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). 
166 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2010). 
167 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.222 (2010) (“Unfair practices with respect to real 
estate transactions, facilities, or services”). 
168 SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE § 14.08.010–215 (2010). 
169 TACOMA MUNICIPAL CODE § 1.29.100 (2010) (“Unlawful discriminatory housing 
practices.”). 
170 See generally Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding tenants 
of apartment complex who alleged they lost benefits of living in an integrated community 
because of landlord's discrimination against nonwhites had standing to sue under Fair 
Housing Act). 
171 See, e.g., Children’s Alliance v. City of Bellevue, 950 F. Supp. 1491, 1495 (W.D. Wa. 
1997); see also Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 1978). 
172 John Relman, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION PRACTICE MANUAL, §2:23, at 2–68 (Oct. 
2008) (“This type of evidence is rare, for the simple reason that ‘most persons will not 
readily admit publicly that they entertain any bias or prejudice against members of 
[protected classes].’”) (quoting U.S. v. Real Estate Development Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 
783 (N.D. Miss. 1972). 
173 See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.110(1) (2010) (describing limits of written notice 
requirements under the fair credit reporting act); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 
59.18.257(3) (2010) (describing extent of notice landlord must give to prospective 
tenant). 
174 See generally Antonio v. Ward’s Cove Packing Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 1477, 1480 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (discussing process for bringing a prima facie disparate treatment claim in the 
employment context). 
175 See Blomgren v. Ogle, 850 F. Supp. 1427, 1437 (E.D. Wa. 1993) (citing Tex. Dept. of 
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1981)). 
176 See id. 
177 Id. 
178 See, e.g., Pasquince v. Brighton Arms Apts., 876 A.2d 834, 838–39 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
2005) (“it is well established that creditworthiness is a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
criteria which landlords are permitted to consider when evaluating prospective tenants”); 
Head v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt., Inc., No. 05-80280-CIV, 2010 WL 3781288 
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2010) (dismissing fair housing claim because “HUD guidelines 
unequivocally permit owners to reject applicants with a poor credit history or with a debt 
to a prior landlord.”); see Cotto v. Jenney, 721 F. Supp. 5, 6–7 (D. Mass. 1989) (“report 
stating that a prospective tenant has fallen behind on its rent payments on a prior occasion 
. . . would certainly give [landlord] pause before incurring a potential financial risk by 
allowing the would-be tenant to occupy the residence.”). 
179 Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 745 (quoting Palmer v. U.S., 
794 F.2d 534, 538–39) (9th Cir. 1986). 
180 Id. at 745–46; see also Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 306 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
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181 See Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 747 (discussing Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of 
Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1254 (10th Cir. 1995)); see also Oliver v. Pac. Nw. 
Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 724 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Wash. 1986) (applying the “business necessity” 
standard to disparate impact claims in Washington State). 
182 See Oliver, 724 P.2d at 1006; see also Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 
1292–93 (8th Cir. 1975) (describing one company’s absolute policy of denying 
employment to anyone convicted with a crime). 
183 According to the U.S. Census in 2000, 12.9 percent of the U.S. population was 
African American. The Black Population: 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 2001), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-5.pdf. Yet throughout the country, 27 
percent of all persons arrested in 2003 were African American. Crime in the United 
States – 2003, Section IV – Persons Arrested FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (2003), 
http://www.fbi.gov/filelink.html?file=/ucr/cius_03/pdf/03sec4.pdf. Of all persons arrested 
that year for drug-related offenses, 32.6 percent were African American. Arrests, 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, (2003), 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t4102003.pdf. African Americans represent a 
greatly disproportionate 45 percent of the U.S. prison population. In all, an African 
American person in 2000 was 8.2 times more likely to be incarcerated than a Caucasian 
person. See Punishment and Prejudice: Racial Disparities in the War on Drugs, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH (MAY 2000), 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/Rcedrg00-01.htm#P167_28183. 
184 See Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship, 56 F.3d at 1254. The seminal case 
concerning the disparate impact of criminal records on rental applicants is Talley v. Lane, 
13 F.3d 1031, 1034 (7th Cir. 1994), which upheld the Chicago Housing Authority’s use 
of HUD-prescribed selection criteria for public housing tenants that excluded 
“individuals with a history of convictions for property and assaultive crimes [who] would 
be a direct threat to other tenants[.]”). See also Evans v. UDR, Inc., 644 F. Supp.2d 675, 
694 (E.D. N.C. 2009) (applicant denied under rental policy providing that “[t]he 
application or occupancy of any person may be denied at any time based on their criminal 
history, in Management's sole and absolute discretion,” but where policy also provided 
that denials for criminal history would be made on a case-by-case basis and limited to 
crimes involving physical violence, property damage, or fraud). But see generally 
Harrison v. Darby, No. 2:08-3874-PMD, , 2009 WL 936469, at *1–6 (D. S.C. Apr. 7, 
2009) (landlord declined to renew lease with tenant due to discovery of unspecified 
“criminal record” on background check). 
185 See, e.g., Oliver, 724 P.2d at 1006–07 (employer’s policy of taking disciplinary action 
against employees based on “dishonest acts committed outside of employment” held not 
to cause a disparate impact African Americans, who were statistically more likely to be 
arrested for property crimes such as theft, because rather than “a flat rule which requires 
automatic termination resulting from commission of a dishonest act, [the employer] 
addresse[d] each specific situation regarding a violation of the standards of conduct on a 
case-by-case basis, and ultimate disciplinary action depend[ed] on a variety of factors.”). 
186 See Green v. Sunpointe Assocs., Ltd., 1997 WL 1526484 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (holding 
that landlord’s policy of refusing to participate in voluntary Section 8 voucher program 
would cause a disparate impact against a protected racial group); accord., Montgomery 
County v. Glenmont Hills, 936 A.2d 325 (Md. App. Ct. 2007) (upholding Maryland 
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statute prohibiting discrimination on basis of lawful source of income); Franklin Tower 
One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 1112 (N.J. 1999) (holding that a landlord's refusal 
to accept a Section 8 voucher violates New Jersey statute to the detriment of low-income 
tenants); but cf. Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apts., 136 F.3d 293, 302 (2nd Cir. 
1998) (holding by a 2–1 decision that a landlord could not be required to accept Section 8 
vouchers even if refusal would cause a disparate impact on a protected class). 
187 See generally Giebeler v. M & B Assocs. Inc., 343 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that landlord must accept applicant’s co-signer as reasonable accommodation for 
applicant’s disability that affected his ability to gain employment). 
188 See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1557–58 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
189 See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding policy of 
automatically denying parole to prisoners with substance abuse histories violated Title II 
of ADA); Green, 523 F.2d at 1298 (holding employer’s policy of excluding from 
employment any person convicted of a crime even if remote in time or relevance was 
overly harsh and not justified by “business necessity”); Oliver, 724 P.2d at 1006 (finding 
plaintiff employee could not bring disparate impact claim against company policy 
requiring employees not to commit criminal acts because policy used subjective criteria 
that were not facially neutral). 
190 See RHA's Rent Right Decision Model, supra note 24. 
191 See Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 746. 
192 See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 6, at 40 (“Numerous studies have shown that those 
who are evicted are typically poor, women, and minorities.”). 
193 See Eric Eckholm, A Sight All Too Familiar in Poor Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
19, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/us/19evict.html. 
194 See Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(noting that a party can establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination by 
demonstrating the following elements: “(1) the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral 
practices, and (2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on persons of a 
particular type produced by the defendant's facially neutral acts or practices.” (quoting 
Palmer v. United States, 794 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1986). 
195See Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A prima facie case of 
disparate impact is ‘usually accomplished by statistical evidence showing ‘that an 
employment practice selects members of a protected class in a proportion smaller than 
their percentage in the pool of actual applicants.’ Although statistical data alone, in a 
proper case, may be adequate to prove causation, the “statistical disparities must be 
sufficiently substantial that they raise such an inference of causation.”) (quoting 
Robinson v. Adams, 847 F.2d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1988) and Ward’s Cove Packing Co., 
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 (1989)). 
196 See John P. Relman, 1 HOUSING DISCRIMINATION PRACTICE MANUAL, § 2:26 (Oct. 
2008) (“Courts of appeals have held that if a defendant’s action has the effect of 
perpetuating segregation ‘and thereby prevents interracial association[,] it will be 
considered invidious under the Fair Housing Act independently of the extent to which it 
produces a disparate effect on different racial groups.’” (quoting Metropolitan Housing 
Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
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197 For this reason, fair housing laws typically prohibit landlords not only from applying 
discriminatory tenant-selection policies to received applications, but also from merely 
describing or advertising discriminatory selection policies. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604 
(2010) (“[I]t shall be unlawful . . . (c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, 
printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or 
rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on 
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to 
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.”); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 
49.60.222(1)(g) (2007). 
198 In this example, for instance, a theoretical plaintiff would need to meet the following 
criteria to establish standing to sue: (i) the tenant would need to have applied for housing 
at a residence and paid a screening fee; (ii) the housing provider would need to have 
obtained a tenant-screening report; (iii) the housing provider would need to have denied 
the application; (iv) the tenant would next have to obtain a copy of the screening report; 
(v) the tenant would then need to promptly apply for subsequent rental; (vi) the tenant 
would have to request that the new housing provider review the tenant’s (already-
obtained) screening report in lieu of charging the tenant the cost of obtaining a new one; 
and (vii) the landlord would need to deny the request. Cf. Lake Valley Assocs., LLC v. 
Township of Pemberton, 987 A.2d 623, 625 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (upholding 
municipal zoning ordinance requiring landlords to “conduct tenant screening for new 
occupants [including] a check for activity in the landlord/tenant section of the Special 
Civil Part of the Superior Court; Municipal Court convictions for the past [three] years; 
and convictions for offenses in the Superior Court for a period of [three] years.”). 
199 WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(1) (2010). 
200 Id. at § 59.18.257(2) (2010). 
201 Id. at § 59.18.257(4) (2010) (emphasis added). 
202 See id. at § 59.18.257(2) (2010); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (2010); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 19.182.090 (2010); see also 2010 Wash. Legis. Serv. 194 (West) (“The 
legislature also finds that it is important to both landlords and tenants that consumer 
information concerning prospective tenants is accurate. Many tenants are unaware of 
their rights under federal fair credit reporting laws to dispute information that may be 
inaccurate. The legislature therefore finds and declares that it is the policy of the state for 
prospective tenants to be informed of their rights to dispute information they feel is 
inaccurate in order to help prevent denials of housing based upon incorrect information.”) 
(amending WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.110 (2009)). 
203 The right to dispute information with furnishers was established in 2003 as part of the 
Fair and Accurate Transactions Act (FACTA) amendments to the federal FCRA. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1681s–2(a)(8) (2010). 
204 See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(2) (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (2010); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 59.18.253 (1991 c. 194) (“The legislature also finds that it is important to both 
landlords and tenants that consumer information concerning prospective tenants is 
accurate. Many tenants are unaware of their rights under federal fair credit reporting laws 
to dispute information that may be inaccurate. The legislature therefore finds and declares 
that it is the policy of the state for prospective tenants to be informed of their rights to 
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dispute information they feel is inaccurate in order to help prevent denials of housing 
based upon incorrect information.”). 
205 See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(2) (2010). 
206See Truly v. Heuft, 158 P.3d 1276, 1281 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that a court 
interpreting a statute “must consider the statute as a whole and avoid rendering any 
section meaningless or superfluous.”). 
207 Such duties now pertain under the federal FCRA to certain “furnishers” who provide 
information to consumer reporting agencies. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(a)(8) (2005). 
However, no such furnisher duties existed prior to the 2003 enactment of FACTA. As 
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(2) was enacted in 1991, the applicant’s “right to dispute 
the accuracy of information provided by the . . . entities listed on the tenant application” 
could not be a reference to a consumer’s right to dispute information with furnishers 
under the federal FCRA. See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(2) (2010). 
208 1991 Wash. Legis. Serv. 194 § 1 (West); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.253 
(2010). 
209 See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(2) (2010). 
210 Id. at § 59.18.020 (2010). 
211 Id. at § 59.18.257 (2010). Curiously, an original version of House Bill 1336 of 1991, 
the bill which later became WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257 (2010), defined “tenant-
screening service” as “a consumer reporting agency as defined in WASH. REV. CODE § 
59.18.240,” and would have amended WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.240 to define “credit 
reporting agency” in the virtually the same way as “consumer reporting agency” is 
defined in the FCRA. 1991 Wash. Legis. Serv. 194 (West) (“credit reporting agency 
means any person who, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, 
regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating 
consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of 
furnishing consumer reports to third parties”); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 
19.182.020(5) (2010). The apparent reason for defining “credit reporting agency” in 
WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.240, however, was a separate portion of HB 1336 that would 
have prohibited a landlord from making a report to a consumer reporting agency about a 
tenant as a reprisal for a tenant’s good faith and lawful act. See 1991 Wash. Legis. Serv. 
194 § 3(2)(e) (West). This provision was later removed, along with the definitions for 
both “credit reporting agency” and “tenant screening service,” so the resulting legislation 
contains no definition for “tenant-screening service.” 1991 Wash. Legis. Serv. 194 § 1 
(West). 
212 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.010(5) (2010). 
213
 WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(2) (2010). 
214 Id. 
215 One exception is myscreeningreport.com, a tenant-screening report that Moco, Inc., 
will prepare at the request of a consumer. This product can enable rental applicants to 
avoid successive application charges, provided the housing providers (to whom the 
applicant applies) accept the report. MY SCREENING REP., 
http://www.myscreeningreport.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2010). 
216 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (2010); Wash. Rev. Code § 19.182.070 (2010). 
217 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(b) (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.100(2) (2010); see also 
§ 19.182.010(1)(a)(iv) (2010) (defining adverse action as “[a]ction or determination with 
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respect to a consumer's application for the rental or leasing of residential real estate that is 
adverse to the interests of the consumer”); 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k) (2010) (defining 
“adverse action”). 
218 See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(1) (2010) (“If a landlord uses a tenant screening 
service, then the landlord may only charge for the costs incurred for using the tenant 
screening service.”). 
219 Id. 
220 See id.; H.B. 1336, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. at § 1; WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(1) 
(1991) (“The legislature finds that tenant application fees often have the effect of 
excluding low-income people from applying for housing because many low-income 
people cannot afford these fees in addition to the rent and other deposits which may be 
required. The legislature further finds that application fees are frequently not returned to 
unsuccessful applicants for housing, which creates a hardship on low-income people. . . . 
[T]herefore . . . it is the policy of the state that certain tenant application fees should be 
prohibited and guidelines should be established for the imposition of other tenant 
application fees.”). 
221 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(w) (2010). 
222 See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257 (2010). 
223 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (d), (f) (defining “consumer report” and “consumer reporting 
agency”). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.010(4)–(5) (defining “consumer report” 
and “consumer reporting agency”). See Wilson, 165 F.3d at 643 (“Rental Research is a 
credit reporting agency that provides information about prospective tenants to subscribing 
landlords . . . . In a typical transaction, the subscriber submits the name, current and 
former addresses, date of birth, and social security number of the prospective tenant to 
Rental Research and asks for an ‘Instant Inquiry’ report. At the time in question, an 
‘Instant Inquiry’ report cost $15. For an additional $14, landlords could also receive a 
‘Verified Completion Report’ (VCR) which, according to Rental Research, reports only 
confirmed information. In preparing an ‘Instant Inquiry’ report, Rental Research relies on 
information compiled from multiple databases, including housing court unlawful detainer 
records in Minnesota, western Wisconsin, and eastern North Dakota and credit reports 
from national credit reporting agencies such as TRW, Inc.”). See also Weisent v. 
Subaqua Corp., No. 102108/07, 2007 WL 2140947 at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) 
(“[C]ompanies known as ‘tenant-screening bureaus’ (‘TSBs’) . . . prepare tenant-
screening reports which they then sell to other companies and to prospective landlords.”). 
224 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (1997) (“Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a 
consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible 
accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”). 
225 See Dennis, 520 F.3d at 1069 (applying federal FCRA to a credit report agency in a 
suit filed by a tenant.). 
226 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (1997); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.060(2) (2010) 
(Washington Fair Credit Reporting Act with identical language). 
227 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(e) (1997) (establishing the same duty for resellers to follow 
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy, but fulfill this duty when 
they resell an accurate copy of a current report obtained from a third-party CRA.). But cf. 
Lewis v. Ohio Prof’l Elec. Network, L.L.C., 248 F.Supp.2d 693, 698 (S.D. Ohio 2003) 
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(stating that “[a]lthough § 1681e(e)(2)(A) uses the term ‘reasonable procedures,’ it does 
not incorporate the same requirements as §1681e(b).”). 
228 See Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995). 
229 See Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 368 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Thompson 
v. San Antonio Retail Merch. Ass’n, 682 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1982)). See also Bryant 
v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 78 (6th Cir. 1982). 
230 Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333. 
231 See CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING, (Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr., 
6th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2008 at § 4.4.5.1.2) (citing Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 
957 (3rd Cir. 1996)); cf. Stewart v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 
Alexander v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 553 F. Supp. 948, 952 (D. Haw. 1982); Wilson v. 
CARCO Grp., Inc., 518 F.3d 40, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
232 See CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., supra note 231, at 26 (citing FAIR CREDIT 
REPORTING ACT § 1681(n) (1977) (Compliance)). 
233 See Testimony of Jonathan Grant, supra note 100. 
234 See Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (“When conducting a 
reinvestigation pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681i, a credit reporting agency must exercise 
reasonable diligence in examining the court file to determine whether an adverse 
judgment has, in fact, been entered against the consumer.”). 
235 See id. 
236 See id. 
237 See id. 
238 See Schoendorf v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313, 321–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002).  
239 Ordering records remotely can take several days or even weeks, a timeline 
incommensurate with that of landlords seeking to make rapid rental decisions. Wilson, 
165 F.3d at 646. 
240 See Dennis, 520 F.3d at 1071. 
241 See Wilson v. Rental Research Servs., 165 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The 
importance of housing and the nature of the rental housing market intensify the damage 
done to consumers who are the victims of an inaccurate report.”). See also Weisent v. 
Subaqua Corp., No. 102108/07, 2007 WL 2140947 at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (filing 
unlawful detainer action against person claiming right of succession to rent-controlled 
apartment would cause a tenant irreparable harm because “regardless whether or not a 
tenant prevails in the Housing Court, his or her name may appear on the blacklist, making 
“the finding of a rental apartment potentially very difficult if not impossible, particularly 
for a tenant of relatively modest means.”) (quoting Pultz v. Economakis, No. 
114915/2004, 2005 WL 1845635, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2005). 
242 See Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 368 (5th Cir. 2001). See also Dennis, 
520 F.3d at 1071. 
243 See Wilson, 165 F.3d at 647. 
244 Ordering records remotely can take several days or even weeks, a timeline 
incommensurate with that of landlords seeking to make rapid rental decisions. See 
Wilson, 165 F.3d at 646. 
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245 See WASH. REV. CODE § 59.18.257(1) (2010) (The King County Superior Court 
charges a per-page fee to view case records online, but the fee is modest ($.10 per page) 
and can be entirely passed along to the landlord, which may pass the charge along to the 
applicant.). Cf. Dennis, 520 F.3d at 1071 (“Experian could have caught Hogan's error if it 
had consulted the Civil Register in Dennis's case, which can be viewed free of charge on 
the Los Angeles Superior Court's excellent website.”). 
246 See WASH. REV. CODE §10.97.040 (2010). 
247 See WASH. REV. CODE §59.18.410 (2010). 
248 Although the statutory duty not to report unverifiable information technically does not 
arise until a consumer has disputed an item, the FCRAs generally establish that 
unverified information—even if true—may not be reported. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5). 
See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.090 (1993). See also F.T.C. v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 1035 
(9th Cir. 2001) (consumer reporting agency must delete unverifiable information from a 
credit report). See also Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 287 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(CRA acquires duty to look beyond original source before reporting information if CRA 
has reason to question accuracy of original source). 
249 Id.; WASH. REV. CODE §10.97.040 (2010). Exceptions to this completeness 
requirement govern the disclosure of non-conviction criminal records for uses unrelated 
to tenant-screening or other credit transactions.  
250 Id. 
251 Id. at § 10.97.080 (2010). 
252 Id. at § 10.97.060 (1977). 
253 Id. at § 10.97.050(1) (2005). 
254 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2) (2010); see WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.040(1)(b) (2010). 
255 See State v. C.R.H., 27 P.3d 660, 663 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (“[C]ourt may order a 
criminal record sealed without express statutory authority”) (citing State v. Noel, 5 P.3d 
747, 749 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)). 
256 WASH. STAT. CT. G.R.15(c)(4) (“When the clerk receives an order to seal the entire 
court file, the clerk shall seal the court file and secure it from public access.”). See also 
WASH. STAT. CT. G.R.15(c)(5) (“When the clerk receives a court order to seal specified 
court records the clerk shall . . . [r]emove the specified court records, seal them, and 
return them to the file under seal or store separately. The clerk shall substitute a filler 
sheet for the removed sealed court record.”). 
257 See, e.g., In re Marriage of R.E., 183 P.3d 339, 344 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (family 
court records may be sealed to protect mental health of children); Noel, 5 P.3d at 749–50 
(criminal conviction records); C.R.H., 27 P.3d at 663 (juvenile records). 
258 See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and 
without unnecessary delay.”); see also Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 640 P.2d 716, 720–
21 (Wash. 1982). Art. I, §10 protects public access to judicial records as well as live 
proceedings. See Allied Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 848 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Wash. 1993); 
State v. McEnry, 103 P.3d 857, 860 (Wash. 2004) (discussing sealing records of court 
proceedings currently underway). 
259 See Seattle Times Co., 640 P.2d at 720; see also WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person 
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”). 
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260 See Indigo Real Estate Servs. v. Rousey, 215 P.3d 977, 981 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009); 
see also McEnry, 103 P.3d at 860. 
261 See WASH. STAT. CT. G.R.15(c). 
262 Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.640(3) (2006) (“Once the court vacates a 
record of conviction . . . the fact that the offender has been convicted of the offense shall 
not be included in the offender's criminal history [and] the offender shall be released 
from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense. For all purposes, including 
responding to questions on employment applications, an offender whose conviction has 
been vacated may state that the offender has never been convicted of that crime.”). See 
State v. Waldon, 202 P.3d 325, 333 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (Art. I, § 7 provides authority 
for court to seal records of vacated conviction to promote ex-offender’s employment, but 
order must be narrowly tailored consistent with the state constitution, as interpreted by 
Seattle Times Co., 640 P.2d 716). See also Noel, 5 P.3d at 749 (trial court erred by failing 
to consider whether compelling circumstances justified an order sealing records of 
misdemeanor convictions even absent statutory authority); WASH. REV. CODE § 
36.23.065 (authorizing destruction of court records for archival purposes; information 
must be retained elsewhere). 
263 See Indigo Real Estate Servs., 215 P.3d at 982. See also McEnry, 103 P.3d at 860 
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